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 THE ENFORCEABILITY OF SECURITY
 INTERESTS IN CONSUMER GOODS*
 ALAN SCHWARTZ
 University of Southern California Law Center and California Institute of Technology
 CONSUMERS who grant security interests to creditors pay lower interest
 rates in return, but this seemingly innocuous arrangement has recently
 been regulated extensively. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code au-
 thorizes courts not to enforce certain security interests if enforcement
 would impose "undue hardship" on the consumer.1 Several states also
 prohibit creditors who foreclose from later suing for deficiency judg-
 ments,2 in which they attempt to recover the difference between the un-
 paid debt and the amount realized on foreclosure. This prohibition re-
 duces the attractiveness of security as a risk reduction device. In
 addition, proposals have been made to prevent creditors from taking se-
 curity interests in consumer goods collateral except for purchase money
 security interests.3
 Contracts made between competent and informed persons in competi-
 tive markets are presumptively enforceable. This is because such con-
 tracts maximize the utility of the parties to them, and commonly social
 * This paper was originally given as an Addison Harris lecture at Indiana University Law
 School (Bloomington). I am grateful for the extraordinary hospitality extended to me by the
 Indiana Law School and for the useful comments its faculty made on a prior version of the
 paper. The paper also benefited from comments received at a seminar in contract theory
 held in the Berkeley Law School and at workshops held at the USC Law Center and the
 Northwestern University Law School. In addition, Alan Axelrod, Melvin A. Eisenberg,
 Thomas Jackson, Will T. Jones, Michael Moore, Stephen J. Morse, Margaret Jane Radin.
 John Schmitz, Matthew Spitzer, James Strnad, and Louis Wilde also made very helpful
 suggestions. Portions of this paper appear in different form in Alan Schwartz and Robert
 Scott, Commercial Law: Principles and Policies (1982).
 1 Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) ? 5.116. The section applies to collateral that
 "is or may be claimed to be exempt from execution on a money judgment under" state law
 but not to purchase money security interests or automobiles.
 2 See text at notes 20-24, infra.
 3 See, for example, Consumer Credit in the United States, Report of the National Com-
 mission on Consumer Finance 27 (1972). A purchase-money security interest is taken by a
 seller or lender to secure the debt the buyer incurs in making the purchase. Model Uniform
 Commercial Code (UCC) ? 9-107.
 [Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXVI (April 1983)]
 ? 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/83/2601-0005$01.50
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 utility as well.4 Also, most nonutilitarian moral schemes accord free and
 autonomous persons the right to make enforceable contracts.5 If the gen-
 eral enforceability of contracts is assumed, two types of reasons may
 justify regulating contracts to give security. First are reasons that follow
 from the failure of the presuppositions on which the "enforceability as-
 sumption" rests. When consumers are incompetent or uninformed, or
 markets behave noncompetitively, regulation of consumer transactions
 often is justifiable.6 Reasons to regulate occasioned by the inapplicability
 of the enforceability assumption are here called "contract law reasons."
 As an example of their application in this context, a court could use the
 unconscionability doctrine to strike down a broad security interest clause
 that is written in fine print and arcane legal language.7 When no contract
 law reasons support nonenforcement, other reasons of fairness or utility
 could require regulation in particular cases. A second set of reasons argu-
 ably justifying the regulation described above thus may derive from the
 peculiar nature of security interests in consumer goods. Consumers may
 be unjustifiably disadvantaged by the giving of security in ways that do
 not disadvantage business debtors. A set of reasons of this second sort is
 in large part responsible for the regulation just described and is the subject
 of this paper.8 The reasons in this second set are as follows:
 4 See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 Va.
 L.R. 1053 (1977). The caveat respecting social utility follows from the possibility that outsid-
 ers to a contract may prefer that it not be made or made in a different form. In this
 circumstance, enforcing the contract as made reduces the utility of the outsiders; depending
 on the relevant magnitudes, enforcement could actually diminish social utility. This possibil-
 ity does seem remote. Also, in consumer contexts the outsiders desiring nonenforcement are
 likely to occupy social statuses higher than those of the consumer parties. When this is so,
 nonenforcement increases the utility of the relatively well off at the expense of the relatively
 worse off, which redistributes wealth in the wrong direction. See id. at 1061-63.
 5 See P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981); Charles Fried, Contract as Promise:
 A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981).
 6 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741
 (1982); Schwartz, supra note 4.
 7 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. App. 1964). This
 paper uses the term "contract law reasons" to capture the notion that some legal problems
 are best analyzed from an ex ante or contract law perspective, where the primary concern is
 whether a set of outcomes-for example, contracts-was generated by a normatively satis-
 factory process, rather than analyzed from an ex post perspective, where the primary
 concern is whether a set of outcomes is itself satisfactory, decided largely independently of
 the process that generated it. In a more concrete sense, "contract law reasons" are those
 that would be grounds for refusing to enforce according to such standard contract law
 doctrines as unconscionability. The reasons about to be considered as justifications for the
 regulation described above fit uneasily, if at all, into standard contract doctrines, which may
 explain why consumer goods security problems seldom are analyzed in contract law terms.
 Ultimately, of course, there are only good or bad reasons for regulation.
 8 A third possible set of reasons that could justify restricting security has to do with the
 nature of security generally. Secured debt may sometimes have undesirable distributional
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 1. Secured creditors are said systematically not to maximize the value
 obtained on resale of the collateral because these creditors can sue for
 deficiency judgments. For example, if the unpaid debt on default is $1,500
 and the collateral has a fair market value of $1,000, a secured creditor, it is
 claimed, will sell the collateral for less than $1,000 and sue for a deficiency
 in excess of $500. The Uniform Commercial Code prohibits this practice
 and gives debtors a cause of action should it occur.9 The UCC's sanc-
 tions, however, are said to be inadequate; alternatively, consumers al-
 legedly lack the resources or sophistication to use the Code's protection.
 In either case, further regulation, such as banning deficiency judgments,
 is thought necessary.
 2. Repossession "destroys value" because individual debtors com-
 monly value goods in excess of their market prices but repossessing cred-
 itors at best resell at these prices. Because repossession imposes greater
 harms on debtors than it creates gains for creditors, it actually minimizes
 welfare.
 3. Creditors seldom repossess in order to reduce the size of the unpaid
 debt with the proceeds of the collateral because these proceeds often are
 trivial. Instead, creditors take security to enable them to coerce payment
 by threats to repossess. This coercion sometimes causes consumers to
 pay debts that are neither legally nor morally owing. Such "in terrorem
 repossessions" use people as means rather than respect them as ends and
 as such are wrongful.10
 4. Enforcing broad security interests may violate some inalienable
 right of debtors to retain the property at issue. An untrammeled power to
 repossess could enable creditors to deprive persons of goods that may be
 necessary to their leading full and autonomous lives. Because people have
 a right to lead such lives, unrestricted security can violate their rights.
 This property rights theme is more hinted at than developed in the discus-
 sions concerning regulation, but it seems an important influence. It appar-
 ently explains such statements as that full enforcement of security inter-
 ests in consumer durables "would cause too great a personal hardship." "
 consequences or be a less efficient form of credit than unsecured debt. This third set of
 reasons now seems not well enough understood to justify regulation. See Alan Schwartz,
 Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. Legal
 Stud. 1 (1981).
 9 UCC ?? 9-504, 9-507.
 10 These three themes are discussed in an interesting and comprehensive paper, William
 C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 1047.
 " Consumer Credit in the United States, supra note 3, at 31. Of the four justifications for
 regulation listed above, the first, that creditors systematically fail to maximize the proceeds
 of repossessed collateral, seemingly could be analyzed under the contract law doctrine of
 good faith; failure to maximize could constitute a violation of the creditor's duty to act in
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 This paper argues that these four reasons cannot justify restricting se-
 curity interests in consumer goods. One way to sustain this argument is to
 suppose consumers to be perfectly informed of the post-default strategies
 that creditors may pursue. As an example, if consumers knew that some
 creditors would not maximize the value of repossessed collateral, and if
 consumers could conveniently monitor creditor promises to maximize,
 creditors would have an incentive to make and comply with such prom-
 ises. The market would create incentives for creditors to compete along
 this dimension of transaction fairness as well as along the more familiar
 dimensions of price and quality. Consumers, however, often seem imper-
 fectly informed respecting creditor strategies, and regulators commonly
 suppose consumers to know little. It thus is useful to ask whether the four
 reasons just set forth can justify regulating security interests if the only
 post-default strategy of which consumers are aware is that secured cred-
 itors will repossess on default. This paper concludes that these justifica-
 tions are unpersuasive even given such limited knowledge. Hence, the
 law applicable to security interests in consumer goods should be drawn
 only from contract law doctrines.12
 The practical importance of this conclusion is that contract theories
 suggest different forms of regulation from those now used. For example,
 unconscionability decisions traditionally are made case by case rather
 than in the form of statutory prohibitions. Alternatively, a legislature
 might choose to regulate security in the way warranties are often regu-
 lated now; that is, it may permit enforcement only of those security inter-
 est clauses that are set forth in "clear and conspicuous" language.13
 Broad statutory prohibitions, however, such as those banning deficiency
 judgments, could be justified only by the second set of reasons just sum-
 good faith. However, while a violation of the duty of good faith would be grounds for a
 defense to an action for a deficiency, standard contract theory does not provide that the
 possibility of violations of the duty can support a prophylactic ban on an entire class of
 transactions. The second justification apparently has no contract analogue. Nor does the
 third, because the creditor's exercising a contract right in order to collect a debt that is
 legally owing apparently does not constitute economic duress. The fourth justification also
 falls without contract law because contract law is not concerned with the assignment of
 property rights but rather with the trades that rights holders are free to make.
 12 This paper assumes rather than determines that consumers are adequately informed
 respecting the prices and terms that constitute credit contracts. See text at notes 6-8, supra.
 For a discussion of how the state should make such determinations and respond to the
 existence of inadequate information, see Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in
 Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa.
 L. Rev. 630 (1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for
 Heterogeneous Goods under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy
 Implications, 12 Bell J. Econ. 181 (1982).
 13 See Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. ?? 2301-12 (1976).
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Tue, 03 Oct 2017 21:49:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 SECURITY INTERESTS 121
 marized. Because these reasons are unpersuasive, prohibitions of this
 sort should not be used.
 Part I briefly describes the principal legal limitations on the taking of
 security. Part II shows that creditors have incentives to maximize the
 proceeds from resale and that the scanty available evidence suggests that
 they do so. Part III argues that no value is lost through repossession or
 that value is merely transferred; if either outcome occurs, the "value
 destruction" case against security falls. Part IV next argues that in ter-
 rorem repossessions are less common than is generally supposed and that
 they are not objectionable when their effect is understood. Finally, Part V
 argues that the moral theories underlying the objection that security vio-
 lates persons' property rights may accord people rights to things but
 cannot sustain present limitations on the power of people to mortgage
 those things. In consequence of these arguments, this paper concludes
 that contracts to give security interests in consumer goods pose only the
 problem that consumer contracts generally pose, which is that the con-
 sent of consumers to them sometimes may not be fully free.14
 I. THE LAW
 Section 9-507(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "every
 aspect of the disposition [of collateral by the secured creditor] including
 the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially rea-
 sonable." Resale "may be by public [i.e., auction] or private proceed-
 ings"; in either case, "reasonable notification" of the sale must be sent to
 the debtor. The secured party is liable to the debtor for "any loss" caused
 by a failure to comply with Article 9. Also, if the collateral is consumer
 goods, the Code imposes a penalty on a creditor who fails to resell in a
 commercially reasonable manner, independently of whether the con-
 sumer debtor suffered loss: the noncomplying creditor is liable for "the
 credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt
 ... plus ten percent of the cash price."15
 These Article 9 rules respond only to one of the grounds that could
 justify regulation of security interests in consumer goods, that creditors
 systematically fail to maximize the collateral's value. The rules, however,
 14 Much of the argument made below also applies to state statutes that permit creditors to
 execute on property after a judgment of default is rendered. Indeed, execution laws may be
 thought of as state-supplied security terms. This paper focuses on consensual security
 interests because much regulatory attention has been devoted to them; readers can make the
 obvious connections to execution laws. Those laws, however, regulate repossession sales
 differently than does the Code and thus deserve independent study.
 15 UCC ? 9-507(1).
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 may be thought not to create sufficient incentives for creditors to max-
 imize. This is partly because ? 9-507(2) provides that a sale cannot be
 found unreasonable just because "a better price could have been obtained
 by a sale at a different time or in a different method"; rather, the price
 obtained is only one of the factors relevant to ascertaining reasonable-
 ness. This latitude could make it difficult for a debtor to prove that his
 creditor actually made a nonmaximizing resale. In addition, many con-
 sumers may lack the resources and sophistication to police compliance
 with Article 9.
 Largely in consequence of these felt difficulties, courts have insisted on
 strict compliance with Article 9 procedures, in particular the notice-of-
 resale requirement, and have created their own sanctions to deter creditor
 misbehavior. The principal sanctions are: (a) in some states, to deny a
 deficiency judgment to a creditor who fails to comply with the Code,16 and
 (b) in other states, to impose on the noncomplying creditor the burden of
 proving that the collateral actually was worth less than the unpaid debt.17
 A creditor who cannot show that the collateral was worth less than the
 unpaid debt has no grounds on which to claim a deficiency. In addition,
 courts have begun to require creditors to explain large differences be-
 tween repossession sale prices and the collateral's apparent value, even
 when a debtor fails to prove the creditor's noncompliance with the stat-
 ute. A creditor who cannot give a satisfactory explanation is precluded
 from recovering a deficiency judgment.18
 These judicial additions to Article 9 respond only partially to the con-
 cerns that underlie the "failure to maximize" justification for limiting the
 ability of consumers to grant security. For example, suppose that auto-
 mobile dealers in a given locality agree to sell repossessed cars to one
 another at less, but not excessively less, than fair market value; however,
 when each dealer repossesses he gives his debtor the requisite Article 9
 notice and otherwise apparently complies with the statute. Few consumer
 debtors have the resources to prove that such a cartel exists, yet without
 such proof the judicial sanctions just set out could not be imposed. Also,
 Article 9, even as supplemented by the courts, is not at all responsive to
 the concerns that commercially reasonable resales can destroy value, be
 used for in terrorem purposes, or violate persons' property rights. Addi-
 tional regulation of security interests in consumer goods thus seems nec-
 essary and exists.
 16 For example, Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 900 (Del. 1980).
 17 For example, Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d 993 (Idaho 1980).
 '" For example, Mercantile Financial Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
 Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 119 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Super. Ct. 1975); American Finance
 Corp. v. DeLong, 437 A.2d 1100 (Vt. 1981).
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 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code limits sellers to taking purchase-
 money security interests, which secure the unpaid portion of the sales
 price.19 Also, when this price is $1,750 or less, the creditor is put to an
 election; if he repossesses, he cannot sue for a deficiency judgment, while
 if he forgoes repossession to sue on the debt, he cannot attach the goods
 in which he has a security interest.20 Finally, the UCCC authorizes courts
 to prevent enforcement of a security interest that a lender takes in house-
 hold goods if nonenforcement "is necessary to avoid undue hardship for
 the consumer or a member of a family . . . supported by him."21 Several
 states regulate much as the UCCC does. California bans deficiencies in
 sales-finance transactions for automobiles;22 Washington bans deficien-
 cies in all sales-finance transactions but not for loans;23 and a variety of
 states ban deficiencies in sales transactions when the sales price is below
 a specified amount.24 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission recently
 developed a proposed Trade Regulation Rule that would prevent creditors
 from taking security in household goods, except purchase money secu-
 rity.25 This Rule also would ban deficiency judgments in connection with
 purchase money security unless "the debtor is credited with the fair
 market retail value of the collateral as determined by a sale in an estab-
 lished retail market."26
 These rules respond in different ways to the four justifications for regu-
 lation set forth above. Banning security is responsive to all of them.
 Banning deficiency judgments responds to the first justification, that cred-
 itors fail to maximize the proceeds obtained on foreclosure, because it
 limits creditors to these proceeds and thus creates a strong incentive for
 creditors to maximize them. The proposed Federal Trade Commission
 Rule also responds to the failure to maximize justification. This is because
 '19 UCCC ? 3.301.
 20 UCCC ? 5.103.
 21 UCCC ? 5.116.
 22 West's Ann. Calif. Civil Code ? 1812.5.
 23 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ? 62(A), ? 9-501(1).
 24 See Ala. Code ? 5-19-13 (sales price $1,000 or less); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 44-5501
 ($1,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. ? 5-5-103 ($2,000); Idaho Code ? 28-35-103 ($2,800); Ind. Code
 Ann. ? 24-4.5-5-103 ($2,200); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, ? 103 ($2,000); Utah Code Ann. ?
 70B-5-103 ($2,800); Wyo. Stat. ? 40-14-503 ($1,000). In addition, six states ban deficiency
 actions in connection with sales or loans when the unpaid balance at the time of default is
 less than a specified amount. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D; ? 22(d) (unpaid balance
 $1,000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A, ? 5-103 ($2,200); Kan. Stat. Ann. ? 16a-5-103 ($1,000);
 Ore. Rev. Stat. ? 83.830, 83.840 ($1,250); W. Va. Code ? 46A-2-119 ($1,000); Wis. Stat. Ann.
 ? 425.209 ($1,000).
 25 Proposed Trade Regulation Rule "Credit Practices," 16 C.F.R. 444.2(a)(4).
 26 Id. at 444.2(a)(7).
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 fair market retail value is the most the collateral could yield; requiring
 creditors to reduce the outstanding debt by this value creates an incentive
 for creditors actually to obtain it. The ban on deficiency judgments also
 discourages the taking of security when the collateral is worth little in
 relation to the debt. It is in this case that the latter three justifications
 seem most compelling, as I will show below.27
 Article 9 of the UCC apparently responds intelligently to the occasional
 cases of creditors' venality or sloth that will inevitably arise. The judicial
 additions to it and the recent statutory and administrative regulation just
 described presuppose the validity of one or more of the four justifications
 for regulation listed above. It is to these justifications that attention must
 be paid.
 II. CREDITORS Do NOT FAIL TO MAXIMIZE
 Many items are repossessed and resold each year. Because persons
 sometimes are careless or lazy, some of these items would be sold at less
 than their best price even if creditors sought to maximize resale proceeds.
 This fact cannot support the legal reforms just described because any
 system is subject to occasional human errors. Supporters of these reforms
 thus must make the stronger claim either that factors systematically pre-
 vent secured creditors from maximizing resale proceeds or that secured
 creditors have incentives not to maximize. No systematic factors have
 been identified that could prevent creditors from maximizing. Perhaps
 because of this, reformers claim that creditors have no incentive to max-
 imize and that the evidence indicates that nonmaximizing resales are
 common.
 Part II shows that it would be irrational of secured creditors wishing to
 maximize profits to fail to maximize resale proceeds, so long as each
 creditor does not act in concert with other creditors. A failure to max-
 imize is a profitable strategy for creditors only if creditors form cartels.
 Part II goes on to argue that creditor cartels to depress the resale prices of
 27 These justifications also support related regulation. As an example, ?? 5.110 and 5.111
 of the UCCC accord consumers a right to cure defaults: if a consumer is in default for ten
 days for failure to make a payment, the creditor is required to send a notice of default; the
 consumer then has twenty days to cure the default. The creditor cannot foreclose during the
 requisite thirty-day period. Comment 3 to ? 5.110 explains that the right to cure is meant to
 prevent excessively prompt repossessions. This seemingly suggests that creditors do better
 by repossessing, selling the goods for less than their market value and suing for a deficiency.
 The first and most well known claim for this view is Philip Shuchman, Profit on Default: An
 Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 20 (1969). The
 right to cure also is justified, in the comment, as preserving the consumer's ability to present
 defenses before foreclosure, which is a major theme underlying the distaste for in terrorem
 repossessions. See text at notes 59-60, infra.
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 collateral are unlikely to exist. Before reaching the arguments underlying
 these conclusions, it is worth stressing what claim actually is to be made
 below and the "deeper" assumptions on which this claim rests. The claim
 is that profit-maximizing creditors have incentives to maximize resale
 proceeds and to eschew cartels. It rests on two deeper assumptions,
 neither of which is defended here: that creditors act as if they attempt to
 maximize profits and that by and large people act effectively in pursuit of
 their goals, which means here that creditors will maximize resale pro-
 ceeds if maximizing is their most profitable strategy.
 A. Creditor Incentives
 The Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on the Proposed Trade
 Regulation Rule described above concisely summarized the claim that
 creditors systematically fail to maximize:
 The creditor does not necessarily have an incentive to obtain the highest possible
 price for the collateral. There are a number of reasons for this, including [1] the
 fact that Article 9 of the UCC which requires that any surplus be repaid to the
 consumer imposes a ceiling on the return available to a creditor in a repossession
 sale. [2] At the same time, the fact that a deficiencies [sic] can be collected from
 consumers in many cases tends to mitigate any necessity of maximizing the re-
 posession sales price. [3] Moreover, any loss to a creditor in the form of an
 uncollected deficiency is mitigated by immediate tax benefits which tend to reduce
 the amount of the actual loss by 50 percent.28
 The report explained, in connection with the second reason given: "In the
 area of high priced collateral, creditors will invest in a repossession sales
 effort only to a point where the net return from the repossession sale
 equals the net return from resources invested in the collection of
 deficiencies. Thus, where the right to collect deficiencies exists, a lesser
 sales effort is a reasonable expectation."29 Respecting the first of these
 reasons, creditors do lack an incentive to maximize the surplus-the
 excess of the collateral's resale price over the unpaid debt-because the
 surplus accrues to debtors. The perceived problem that prompted the le-
 gal reforms described above, however, was not that resales generated
 insufficient surpluses; a surplus is rare when consumer goods are resold.
 Decision makers were instead concerned with the possibility that non-
 maximizing resales increased the deficiencies that consumers had to pay.
 Moreover, if creditors maximize the proceeds received from resold collat-
 28 "Credit Practices" Staff Report and Recommendation on Proposed Trade Regulation
 Rule, 16 CFR Part 444, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection 288
 (footnotes omitted) (integers added) (1980). This view apparently is also becoming influential
 in England. See R. Cranston, Consumers and the Law 215 (1978).
 29 Id. at 289.
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 eral when its value equals or is less than the outstanding debt, the problem
 of insufficient surpluses should vanish. This is because creditors com-
 monly set up systems whereby repossessed collateral is sold. If these
 systems are designed to maximize resale proceeds, because the collateral
 commonly is worth less than the unpaid debt, the occasional surplus will
 also be maximized, for creditors have no reason to identify resales likely
 to generate surpluses and then vary the standard routine only for the
 purpose of reducing them. Thus, if standard practice is to maximize,
 surpluses also should be maximized.
 When the collateral will bring less than the unpaid debt, standard prac-
 tice allegedly is not to maximize because of the availability of deficiency
 judgments, the second reason the FTC staff gave, but this reason is false.
 If secured creditors maximize profits and do not act in concert with other
 creditors, each creditor must do worse by not maximizing resale value
 than by maximizing it.
 To see why, suppose first that (1) creditors bear their own litigation
 costs; (2) these costs vary directly with the sums at issue; (3) debtors bear
 their creditors' resale costs; (4) debtors always can pay judgments entered
 against them; (5) creditors value dollars obtained through litigation
 equally with dollars obtained through resale, even though "litigation dol-
 lars" are obtained some time after resale dollars. In these circumstances,
 a creditor has an incentive to sell the collateral for as much as possible
 and to sue for as little as possible. This is because resale costs are free to
 him, while litigation costs are not free and rise with the amounts for which
 he sues. Respecting the first three of these assumptions, ? 9-504 of the
 UCC authorizes creditors to charge debtors with resale costs, and in the
 United States parties commonly bear their own litigation costs. These
 costs probably do rise with the amounts at issue since large claims are
 likely to be more seriously contested than small ones and courts are more
 likely to demand convincing proof of the validity of large claims. Hence,
 creditors have an incentive to maximize resale revenues, which can only
 be done by reselling the collateral at the market price.
 It may be objected that creditors often shift their litigation costs to
 defaulting debtors by contract. This objection must fall because the con-
 clusion that creditors have an incentive to maximize resale proceeds ob-
 tains even if assumption 1 is false, when assumptions 4 and 5 also are
 false. To see that these assumptions are both false and germane, one
 should realize that secured creditors actually attempt to recover unpaid
 debts in two stages. At the first stage the creditor repossesses and resells
 the collateral; at the second stage he sues for a deficiency. The first stage
 recovery is certain, in the sense that the creditor always can resell at the
 market price, and is relatively prompt because the creditor can resell soon
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 after default. The second stage recovery is subject to risk because the
 debtor may be or become insolvent, in which case the creditor will re-
 cover only a fraction of the debt; the second stage recovery is also de-
 layed, for even uncontested lawsuits take time, and the legal rate of
 interest allowed on judgments commonly is lower than the rate the cred-
 itor could earn on the same sum. Because the stage 1 recovery is certain
 and prompt while the stage 2 recovery is risky and delayed, the creditor
 has an incentive to make the former recovery as large as possible and the
 latter as small as possible. This incentive exists even if the sales contract
 shifts the creditor's litigation costs to the debtor. The largest recovery
 possible at stage 1 equals the collateral's market value; therefore, the
 creditor has an incentive to recover this amount-to maximize the pro-
 ceeds of resale.
 This conclusion also obtains independent of the costs of recovering a
 debt by resale as contrasted with the costs of recovering a debt by legal
 action. Although the creditor has a right to recover resale costs in the
 deficiency suit, it would be unlawful and unwise of the creditor to resell
 when resale costs exceed resale proceeds.30 When resale costs are less
 than resale proceeds, the creditor's incentive is to maximize the differ-
 ence between these values, for it actually is this sum that is obtainable
 without risk or delay. The difference between resale gains and costs is
 maximized at the highest price the collateral can command, its value in
 the market. Perhaps a more concise way of putting this is that every dollar
 the creditor nets by resale reduces the outstanding debt by a dollar; every
 dollar the creditor defers to the deficiency action to collect will reduce the
 outstanding debt by less than a dollar because the expected value of a
 litigation dollar is less than one, these dollars being subject to risk and
 delay. Thus the creditor's incentive is to maximize the net gain from
 resale.
 An example may illuminate this analysis. Suppose that a bank takes a
 security interest in a new car, the debtor makes several payments and
 defaults, and the bank repossesses. Then, (i) the unpaid debt (D) is
 $5,000; (ii) the value a maximizing resale (M) would bring is $3,000; (iii)
 the value of a nonmaximizing resale (N) is $1,500; (iv) the probability (p),
 30 UCC ? 9-504(3) requires resales to be conducted in a "commercially reasonable"
 manner. This section would bar a creditor from suing for the excess of resale costs over
 gains. This is because the creditor would resell when the costs exceed the gains only to
 impose a penalty on the debtor in the amount of the difference, and penalties have been held
 to be inappropriate sanctions for contract breaches; hence it is "unreasonable" of creditors
 to exact them. Creditors are said sometimes to repossess when resale costs exceed resale
 gains in order to establish a credible threat that will induce other debtors to pay, see text at
 notes 59-60, infra; they would not resell in this event, however, because they could not
 recover the resultant loss.
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 as observed by the creditor, that the defaulting debtor will become (or is)
 insolvent is .2; (v) the bankruptcy discount (b) is $0.12, in that the creditor
 would collect $0.12 on the dollar if the debtor actually became insolvent
 and entered bankruptcy proceedings;31 (vi) the creditor can collect a
 deficiency judgment no sooner than three months after resale of the collat-
 eral and can collect in insolvency proceedings no sooner than six months
 after resale; (vii) the creditor's discount rate (r) is 10 percent; (viii) for
 simplicity, fixed costs are zero and marginal collection costs per dollar
 collected by resale are constant at c, while marginal collection costs per
 dollar collected by a deficiency action are constant at c'; (ix) c = c' =
 $0.20 per dollar; and (x) the debt remaining after a maximizing resale is D
 - M = A; the debt remaining after a nonmaximizing resale is D - N =
 B, where B > A.
 Suppose first that the creditor considers making a maximizing resale.
 At stage 1, he could recover M - cM = $2,400. The expected value of his
 stage 2 recovery is
 (1 - p)[(A + cM) - c'(A + cM)] 1 $1,624.06
 1 +4?
 4)
 and
 p(b)[(A + cM) - c'(A + cM)] 1 = $47.52.
 Hence, the expected value of maximizing resale proceeds and then suing
 for a deficiency is $4,071.58. Using the same formula but substituting N
 for M and B for A, the expected value of not maximizing and then suing is
 31 The $0.12 figure is a rough approximation. A well-known early study reported that
 creditors recover approximately $0.08 on the dollar in insolvency proceedings. See Vern
 Countryman and Andrew Kaufman, Commercial Law* 170 (1971). More recent studies show
 that in 1977 creditors received no money at all in 81 percent of bankruptcy cases. In cases in
 which assets were distributed, general creditors received 27 percent of the $229 million
 available for distribution-$61 million-but more than $1.1 billion of claims were dis-
 charged. A creditor suing for a deficiency is a general creditor and is unlikely to do as well as
 $0.12 on the dollar if the debtor does go bankrupt. See V. Countryman, A. Kaufman, & Z.
 Wiseman, Commercial Law Cases and Materials 250 (1982). On the other hand, some
 deficiencies may be collected without bankruptcies. Recovery percentages reported by ma-
 jor creditors to the FTC ranged from 6 to 25 percent of deficiencies outstanding, but the
 figures were ambiguous in some cases. See Martin White, Consumer Repossessions and
 Deficiencies: New Perspectives from New Data, 62 B. U. L. Rev. 385 (1982). The text's
 conclusions, as the App. below shows, are not sensitive to the precise portion of the debt
 that creditors can recover in deficiency actions.
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 $3,643.09. In this illustration, the costs of recovering a dollar of debt were
 assumed not to vary with the collection method used (c = c'). Suppose
 instead that c = 16c', where c = $0.80 per dollar collected by resale and
 c' = $0.05 per dollar collected by suit for a deficiency. Then, using the
 values set out above, the expected value of making a maximizing resale
 and then suing is $3,959.24, while the expected value of making a non-
 maximizing resale and then suing is $3,888.29. The principal illustration
 also supposed the creditor to bear his own litigation costs. Let the debtor
 bear these costs and again let c = 16c'. Then the expected value of a
 maximizing resale ($4,131.02) is $56.67 greater than the expected value of
 a nonmaximizing resale ($4,074.35). A proof in the Appendix generalizes
 all of these examples; it shows that maximizing resale proceeds is always
 the dominant creditor strategy.32
 The examples also illustrate the error of the third reason the FTC staff
 gave to explain why creditors would not maximize, that a creditor's con-
 cern over an unpaid deficiency judgment is mitigated by his ability to
 deduct bad debt losses. In the principal example above, the expected
 after-tax loss to the creditor who maximizes the proceeds of resale, sup-
 posing a marginal corporate tax rate of 44 percent, is $519.92. (An unpaid
 debt of $5,000 less $4,071.58, the expected value of collection, leaves an
 expected tax deduction of $928.42, which with a 44 percent marginal
 corporate tax rate imposes on the creditor an after-tax loss of .56 x the
 deduction.) The expected after-tax loss to the creditor who does not
 maximize is higher-$799.87, a difference of $239.95. This result is not
 surprising because the effect of the tax is to enable a corporate creditor to
 keep $0.56 of every dollar it earns and to benefit by $0.56 from every
 dollar it deducts, supposing it to have income. Thus the creditor cannot
 gain by forgoing income, which loses it $0.56 per dollar, in order to
 increase deductions, for these gain it only $0.56 per dollar. A creditor
 therefore will regard the availability of tax deductions as irrelevant to the
 decision whether to maximize or not.33
 32 See App., infra.
 33 Creditors may be thought to have an incentive not to maximize resale proceeds in order
 to impose a penalty on defaulting debtors; the penalty would be the difference between the
 collateral's fair market value and the lower resale price the creditor actually obtains. This
 penalty would be imposed to deter defaults. See Sec. IV, infra, discussing in terrorem
 repossessions. For such a penalty to be effective, debtors would have to know both that
 creditors will fail to maximize and the consequences to debtors of this failure. If debtors
 were this informed about possible creditor post-default strategies when they initially bought
 credit, however, they could cause creditors to face the choice of abandoning unfair strate-
 gies or losing business. This paper plausibly assumes a lower level of debtor knowledge. See
 text at note 12, supra. A consequence of this assumption is to render ineffective a creditor
 strategy of not maximizing in order to penalize and thereby deter defaults. Also, creditors
 should be reluctant to make explicit the intention not to maximize, for this would be to admit
 openly to an illegal practice.
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 B. Wholesale Sales
 Financial creditors such as banks and sales finance companies fre-
 quently sell repossessed collateral in wholesale rather than retail markets.
 Because retail sales generate higher returns, the practice of wholesaling
 repossessions is thought to disadvantage consumers. Moreover, the prac-
 tice of some creditors to make wholesale sales when retail markets are
 available is considered to support the claim that creditors systematically
 fail to maximize resale proceeds.34 In consequence of these views, pro-
 posals have been made to require or encourage retail sales in all cases. An
 example of such a proposal is the FTC's suggested rule that would permit
 wholesale sales but require financers to credit consumers with the amount
 that actual good faith retail sales would bring.35 The Commission staff
 apparently thought their rule would work in the following way: Let a bank
 repossess a car on which $8,000 is owed and sell the car to a dealer for
 $4,000. The dealer retails the car for $6,000. Under the proposed rule, the
 bank must credit the debtor with the amount that the retail sale brought-
 $6,000-and thus could sue only for a $2,000 deficiency. Since the bank
 would then incur a $2,000 loss, banks are likely to sell at retail if the rule is
 passed. Whether they do or not, consumers will benefit because they will
 be liable for lower deficiencies.
 The examples in Section IIA above showed that creditors always do
 better by maximizing resale proceeds. Consumers do better as well, be-
 cause a maximizing resale reduces the deficiency that the debtor owes. In
 the example just used, however, a bank chose to resell at wholesale,
 recovering $4,000, rather than to obtain $6,000 by selling at retail. This
 example does not refute the analysis above when resale costs are consid-
 ered. Section IIB next shows, through a more careful analysis of this
 example, that a profit-maximizing financer probably would want to
 wholesale his repossessions.
 It is best to begin by focusing on the difference between the wholesale
 34 For claims in this regard, see, for example, Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 275-87,
 317-18; Comment, Defaulting Debtors and the Judicial Process-the FTC's Proposed Re-
 striction on Deficiency Judgments: section 444.2(a)(7) of the Rule on Credit Practices, 8
 Conn. L. Rev. 457 (1976); Note, I Can Get It for You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of
 Automobile Deficiency Judgments, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1081 (1975).
 35 See text at note 26, supra. White, supra note 31, proposes that the retail price should
 be presumptive evidence of the maximizing price; creditors could rebut the presumption
 "by establishing suitable facts concerning the condition of the repossessed vehicle or unique
 market circumstances." Id. at 414 (footnote omitted). Two states have adopted limited
 versions of the rule requiring firms to credit consumers with the retail price. Florida Statutes
 Annotated ? 516.31(3) (applies only to licensed small loan companies); Connecticut Gen.
 Stat. ? 42-98(g) (retail value is an important element in determining the "fair market value"
 that firms must credit against deficiencies).
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 and retail prices-the $2,000 premium in the illustration above. This pre-
 mium has two elements: the cost of putting a repossessed car in shape for
 resale and a payment to the retail dealer, including the dealer's profit, for
 the service of running a retail business. Because the dealer cannot con-
 duct his business unless he is able to buy at wholesale, a portion of the
 $4,000 deficiency judgment that current law allows the bank to recover
 actually supports the retail facility.
 If the bank, in this illustration, had instead retailed its repossessions,
 debtors would be liable for a deficiency that would amount to at least
 $4,000. This is because the bank would need a retail facility. Suppose that
 the bank had the same retail costs as the dealer and resold for $6,000; it
 would then be able to sue for a $4,000 deficiency under the Code, cal-
 culated as follows: deficiency = unpaid debt ($8,000) - proceeds of
 resale ($6,000) + costs of resale ($2,000) = $4,000. To deny the bank the
 $2,000 in resale costs would be to require it to provide a retail facility for
 free.36 Thus, if banks and dealers could retail cars at equal cost, both
 banks and consumers would be indifferent to whether banks wholesaled
 or retailed; either method would generate the same deficiency.
 Dealers, however, commonly can retail repossessed cars at less cost
 than banks or finance companies because financers have expertise in the
 lending business but not in the used goods business, while dealers com-
 monly have the reverse competencies.37 When the financer's cost disad-
 vantage is considered, the error of encouraging financers to become retail-
 ers becomes apparent. Suppose that it would cost the bank in the
 illustration above $2,200 to retail the car rather than the $2,000 it costs the
 dealer. A retail sale then would net the financer $3,800-$6,000 in proceeds
 36 The FTC, proceeding by adjudication, recently held that an automobile dealer com-
 mitted an unfair trade practice by charging indirect expenses such as overhead and lost
 profits to consumers who had defaulted and whose cars were repossessed. It was industry
 practice to make such charges. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed without reaching the
 merits, holding that the rule developed by the FTC "will have general application" because
 "credit practices similar to those of the dealer are widespread in the car dealership indus-
 try," and therefore the FTC had to proceed by rulemaking; it could not create such a
 widespread rule through adjudication. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir.
 1981). The justification for allowing retailing banks or dealers to recover profit and overhead
 is identical to the justification for allowing sellers to recover these items under ? 2-708(2) of
 the UCC. Creditors invest resources in creating facilities to retail used goods; if they cannot
 recover the resultant capital costs and fixed costs (profit and overhead), they will not be put
 in the position they would have been had debtors performed.
 37 Many creditors testified before the FTC that they made wholesale sales because they
 preferred to lend money rather than sell cars. See Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 289-90.
 The FTC staff said of this policy that it "reflects the fact that higher returns are available to
 the creditor when resources are devoted to activities other than U.C.C. sales," but the staff
 believed that this application of the principle of comparative advantage injured consumers.
 Id. at 290-91. The text next shows that this belief is false.
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 less $2,200 in costs. A wholesale, however, nets $4,000. Thus when
 financers are less efficient retailers than dealers, which often seems the
 case, a wholesale sale actually maximizes net resale proceeds. Because
 this is so, the common practice of financers to make wholesale sales
 cannot count as evidence in support of the claim that creditors system-
 atically fail to maximize the value of repossessed collateral. In addition,
 efforts such as those of the FTC's staff to encourage financers to retail
 repossessions would disadvantage debtors by increasing the deficiencies
 for which debtors would be liable. In the illustration above, the deficiency
 would increase from $4,000 to $4,200 were the FTC rule to apply.
 To summarize the argument to this point, secured creditors who wish to
 maximize profits and who do not act in concert with other creditors al-
 ways will do better by maximizing the proceeds from resale of the collat-
 eral. The common practice of financing creditors to wholesale reposses-
 sions does not contradict this conclusion. The failure to maximize justifi-
 cation for law reform therefore must fall unless cartels exist.
 C. Cartels
 Cartels of two kinds might exist respecting the resale of repossessed
 goods. First, a group of dealers could agree to bid collusively on repos-
 sessed items offered for sale such that each dealer is assured a supply of
 low-priced goods which can then be resold at retail prices. In this circum-
 stance, the creditor that actually repossessed could be attempting to max-
 imize the resale value of the collateral but be prevented from doing so by
 the dealer cartel. "Collusive bidding cartels" might exist in connection
 with public resales, when repossessed items are sold at auction. Second, a
 group of dealers who carry their own paper or who use recourse
 financing38 might agree to resell collateral to each other for less than the
 collateral's value. For example, suppose dealer A repossessed a car
 worth $3,000 when the unpaid debt was $5,000, sold the car to dealer B for
 $1,500, and sued for a $3,500 deficiency. Section IIA showed that this was
 a losing strategy. But suppose dealer A knew that dealer B would resell
 him a repossessed car for $1,500 less than its actual value shortly thereaf-
 ter. Then dealer A's expected loss from failing to maximize-$428.49 in
 the principal example above-is swamped by his expected gain-the
 large difference between the retail price of the car later to be purchased
 from dealer B and the low wholesale price that dealer B will exact. Be-
 38 In a recourse financing arrangement, the dealer extends purchase money credit to the
 consumer and sells the consumer's obligation to a financer, but the dealer is responsible for
 collecting the debt if the consumer defaults. Thus the dealer commonly repossesses and
 resells the collateral.
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 cause any two dealers are unlikely to have precisely matching reposses-
 sion experiences, a "dealer trading cartel" such as this would need sev-
 eral members, although probably fewer than the collusive bidding cartels
 described above.39
 The gain to participants in both of these cartels comes from being able
 to buy repossessed goods at artificially depressed wholesale prices and to
 resell them for full retail value. Because banks and sales finance com-
 panies sell repossessed goods but never buy them, these financers have
 no incentive to join either cartel. Indeed, the financers would oppose
 collusive bidding cartels because these cartels reduce the returns from
 repossession sales. And dealer trading cartels would seldom be market-
 wide because financers can compete with dealers to finance sales. The
 question is whether either form of cartel could function in these circum-
 stances.
 This is an empirical question that cannot be finally answered on the
 available data. No persuasive evidence of the existence of either form of
 cartel has been adduced, nor has any been successfully prosecuted. These
 facts are not conclusive. Successful cartels seldom are revealed by aca-
 demic inquiry. Also, academic inquiries must use publicly available data,
 such as profits and price movements. Outsiders cannot easily obtain profit
 figures for the small, often privately held firms that will constitute any
 cartel; and actual transaction prices of used goods are difficult to observe.
 39 Section 9-504(3) of the UCC requires a creditor to give the debtor notice of a reposses-
 sion sale, and ? 9-506 gives the debtor a right to redeem the collateral by paying the debt in
 full plus the creditor's expenses. If a creditor proposes to sell the collateral for much less
 than its value, the debtor, in theory, could refinance on the strength of its actual value and
 redeem. Thus both versions of the cartel explanation must presuppose the inefficacy of
 debtor redemption rights. Defaulting debtors seldom do redeem, which is consistent with
 this presupposition; but they also may fail to redeem because the collateral is routinely
 resold at the market price. A third way in which creditors could do better by not maximizing
 would be for them to buy at their own repossession sales. Suppose that a creditor reposses-
 ses a car worth $3,000 when the debt was $5,000, "sells" the car to himself for $1,500, and
 sues for a $3,500 deficiency; the creditor then resells the car for $3,000. This creditor would
 do better than if he initially had sold the car for $3,000 because, while in both cases he
 recovers the car's actual value, in the latter case he could claim only a $2,000 deficiency.
 Creditors sometimes do buy at their own repossession sales, but the evidence fails to show
 that they claim deficiencies greater than those claimed by creditors who do not. Perhaps this
 is because courts will scrutinize more carefully sales to oneself and because a debtor could
 so easily show bad faith in these cases; a comparison of the sale to oneself with the sale to
 others would generally suffice. In this connection, ? 9-507 of the UCC, which creates a
 statutory penalty for noncompliance with Article 9, seems less toothless than is commonly
 supposed. As an example, in one case the amount financed on a car was $5,938.67 and the
 finance charge was $1,363.51. On default, the creditor resold the car without giving the
 debtor the statutory notice and sued for a deficiency of $1,392.61. The debtor, representing
 himself, successfully claimed that the failure to give notice invoked the 9-507 penalty; that
 this penalty amounted to $1,957.37; and that the deficiency claim thus was wiped out. See
 Garza v. Brazos County Federal Credit Union, 608 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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 These problems would make hard evidence of the existence of cartels
 unusual even if the cartels themselves were common. In addition, cartels
 in connection with the resale of used consumer goods will occur-if at
 all-in local markets, and state antitrust enforcement is seldom vigorous.
 Thus little can be inferred from the absence of prosecutions against them.
 With the record in this state, the best that can be done is to ask whether
 the industry or firm traits that seemingly correlate with collusive behavior
 exist when repossessed collateral is resold. If these traits exist in
 insufficient degree, as is argued below, the burden should shift to propo-
 nents of the failure to maximize justification for law reform to prove that
 creditor cartels are in fact present. This is because, as shown above,
 without cartels such as those described here this justification must fall.
 The discussion focuses mainly on used car markets because creditor mis-
 behavior is said to be most prevalent there.40
 1. Collusive Bidding Cartels. The likelihood that firms will cartelize
 an industry varies inversely with the costs to the firms of making and
 policing collusive arrangements and varies directly with the ability of
 firms to retain significant gains from cartel behavior. Several more
 specific factors that seem to correlate positively with the existence of
 cartels have been derived from these general observations. Firms will
 incur relatively lower costs in forming and policing cartels when few firms
 exist because it is easier to make lasting arrangements among few than
 among many. Also, cartel costs are lower when firms deal in homoge-
 neous goods because then the only variable on which agreement must be
 secured is the price. Respecting the ability of firms to retain gains from
 cartel behavior, cartel members have an incentive to steal customers from
 one another by offering buyers prices below the high cartel price but
 above the competitive price; if many members act in this way, the cartel
 will dissolve because firms that adhere to cartel arrangements would have
 no customers. The opportunities for cheating are lower when all sales are
 made publicly, so that the terms are observable; when firms have large
 market shares, so that the expansion of firm output that cheating produces
 is noticeable; and again when product and sales terms are homogeneous,
 so that firms cannot grant difficult-to-detect nonpecuniary price reduc-
 tions such as more extensive warranties. Finally, the ability of firms to
 retain gains from cartel behavior is higher when entry into the industry is
 difficult. Were entry easy, outside firms would have a strong incentive to
 come in and steal cartel customers by undercutting the cartel's price. The
 40 See, for example, "Consumer Credit in the United States," supra note 3, at 31.
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 prospect of such entry could reduce the expected gain from cartelizing
 below the expected cost; in this event, a cartel is unlikely to be formed.41
 These factors suggest that effective collusive bidding cartels to depress
 the prices at which collateral is resold should rarely exist. This is because
 such cartels would have to contain many members, concern heterogene-
 ous goods, and be sustainable although entry is easy. Respecting the first
 difficulty, almost all dealers in a given market would have to be members
 because a very few firms could destroy a cartel by overbidding at public
 auctions. Used car markets commonly contain a considerable number of
 firms; hence, effective collusive bidding cartels must have a relatively
 large membership. Respecting the second difficulty, the supply curve of
 repossessed cars will contain goods that differ by age and physical condi-
 tion as well as make and model. Also, potential cartel participants are
 likely to have different capacities and profit experiences. In these circum-
 stances, the problem of constructing a price schedule-the amount to be
 bid per car-and an allocation-the number and type of cars each mem-
 ber is permitted to buy-seems more difficult to solve than the coordina-
 tion problems that faced most reported cartels.42 Respecting the last
 difficulty, entry is "free" in the sense that a potential entrant would suffer
 no disadvantage in either production technique or perceived product qual-
 ity (per unit of cost) relative to incumbents; the entrant needs primarily to
 lease a lot, for he can draw cars and sales personnel from the same
 distributions that incumbents face. A cartel might consider setting prices
 above the monopsony level to deter entry, but given the ease of entry, it
 would seem that entry-deterring bids on repossessed collateral would
 have to be close to actual values; in this event, the gains from cartel
 behavior are unlikely to exceed the costs. Also, because used car markets
 are regional in scope at the wholesale level, firms in other local markets
 41 A good analysis of the factors seemingly conducive to collusion is found in F. M.
 Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 199-227 (1980). See also
 John M. Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 Antitrust Law and
 Econ. Rev. 69 Spring (1969). The analysis above ignores two factors commonly discussed in
 connection with cartels, the effect on the likelihood of cartel behavior of the ability of firms
 to innovate and of declines in demand for the industry's product. See Scherer, supra;
 Kuhlman, supra; John Palmer, Some Economic Conditions Conducive to Collusion, 6 J.
 Econ. Stud. 29 (1972). These factors are ignored here because potential cartel members are
 retail dealers and thus have a limited ability to innovate, and because the proponents of the
 failure-to-maximize justification apparently assert its applicability under all market condi-
 tions. The factors the text does discuss must be regarded as tentatively valid because they
 are based primarily on studies of cartels that have been prosecuted. Whether these factors
 characterize all firms or only those in the "prosecution prone" category is unknown, but the
 factors are the best we have. See Peter Asch & Joseph Seneca, Characteristics of Collusive
 Firms, 23 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (1975).
 42 See authorities cited in note 41, supra.
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 will enter to bid up prices whenever a cartel has depressed these prices by
 more than the difference between actual wholesale value and shipping
 costs. Creditors such as banks have an incentive to notify outside firms of
 such opportunities.
 If a collusive bidding cartel overcame these difficulties, it would have to
 face the problem of a vanishing supply of cars. This is because financers
 seriously disadvantaged by cartels probably would refuse to make pur-
 chase money loans to consumers. Instead, they would buy consumer
 paper from dealers pursuant to recourse arrangements. In such arrange-
 ments, the dealer must repay the financer if the debtor defaults and then
 must dispose of the collateral. If many financers shift to recourse
 financing rather than repossess and resell the collateral themselves, the
 cartel's supply of cars will vanish. To be sure, recourse financing is more
 costly to financers than direct consumer loans when these loans are
 routinely made but probably would be less costly than remaining supine
 before an effective collusive bidding cartel.
 To summarize, analysis suggests that collusive bidding cartels are un-
 likely to depress the prices at which repossessed collateral is sold. As
 indicated above, little direct evidence of such cartels exists.43 Respecting
 indirect evidence, casual surveys of automobile repossessions show that
 financing creditors recover approximately 80 percent of the "wholesale
 value" of the cars they sell.44 This wholesale value represents a prediction
 by knowledgeable observers of the selling prices of used cars in salable
 condition at the beginning of each car's model year. At least part of the
 apparent 20 percent discount off wholesale value is accounted for by three
 43 The FTC staff asserted that collusive practices were common but that their "clandes-
 tine nature" made it "impossible to quantify their prevalence." A California bank did testify
 to the Commission that it faced "unduly depressed bidding" when making "remote disposi-
 tions" of collateral. It avoided the problem by creating a "centralized 'Collateral Control
 Center.' " See "Credit Practices," supra note 28, at 292. Apparently, no other financial
 creditor testified respecting collusive bidding. In very small towns, few enough dealers may
 exist to make plausible their attempting to form a cartel, but as the testifying bank's experi-
 ence shows, the regional nature of used car markets makes the success of such cartels
 unlikely.
 44 The FTC study indicated that Ford Motor Credit Co. obtained 82 percent of the
 wholesale book value, Bank of America obtained 79 percent of wholesale, and Security
 Pacific National Bank recovered 77.1 percent of wholesale. See "Credit Practices," supra
 note 28, at 266-67, n. 42. The Stanford study showed that creditors in Alameda County,
 California, received 84 percent of the wholesale book value. See Note, supra note 34, at
 1085. A study of repossessions in Washington, D.C., indicated that creditors obtained 81
 percent of the wholesale value. See Note, Business as Usual: An Empirical Study of Auto-
 mobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District of Columbia, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 511, 516-21
 (1971). Professor Schuchman's initial study of Hartford, Conn., repossessions revealed a 71
 percent average and a 75 percent median recovery of wholesale value. See Schuchman,
 supra note 27, at 62-67.
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 factors: the expense of putting repossessed cars into salable condition;45
 the fact that used cars are offered for sale throughout the year; and the
 riskiness of purchasing from financers, who commonly lack the facilities
 to diagnose and remedy defects. Any unaccounted-for difference between
 book and actual wholesale prices seems too small alone to support the
 inference that collusive bidding cartels exist.
 2. Dealer Trading Cartels. In dealer trading cartels, a relatively
 small group of dealers resell repossessed cars to each other at less than
 wholesale prices. These cartels need fewer members than collusive bid-
 ding cartels, but they too face the difficulties of product heterogeneity and
 ease of entry. Respecting entry, if cartelization generated excess profits in
 particular markets, new firms probably would enter because entry costs
 are low. In addition, dealers compete with financers in offering credit to
 consumers. If dealers routinely began to claim greater deficiencies than
 financers on otherwise similar loans, because of dealer trading cartels,
 dealer credit would become more expensive than financer credit. Con-
 sumers would then have an incentive to shift away from dealer credit;
 their ability to do this conveniently also reduces the expected gain to
 cartel behavior.
 Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the formation of dealer trading
 cartels lies in the opportunity members would have to cheat and in the
 difficulty of detecting and preventing cheating. Firms would be tempted to
 lie about their bad debt experiences when participating in the creation of
 periodic allocations of purchases they make from and sales they make to
 the cartel. This is because each cartel member has an incentive to pur-
 chase goods from the cartel at very low wholesale prices but to retail
 these goods at market value. Members would justify making many low-
 price purchases by claiming that their debtors are quite likely to become
 insolvent; in such cases the expected loss from making low-price sales-
 from not maximizing-is high,46 so the ability to make low-price pur-
 chases is essential to profitability. Cartel members also have an incentive
 to sell goods to the cartel at high prices because, respecting each individ-
 ual default, the higher the price obtained on resale the lower is the ex-
 pected loss. Members would justify making high-price sales by claiming
 45 General Motors Acceptance Corp. reported to the FTC that its repossessed cars were
 in "good," "fair," "poor," or "wrecked" condition. GMAC claimed to recover 94.4 per-
 cent of wholesale value on good cars and 80.8 percent of wholesale for fair cars. ("Credit
 Practices," supra note 28, at 300.) A recent study using FTC data reached approximately the
 same results. See Philip Schuchman, Condition and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21
 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 15 (1979).
 46 When the probability of debtor insolvency increases, the expected yield of a deficiency
 action falls, thereby increasing the expected loss to the creditor of not maximizing the
 proceeds from resale. See App.
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 that other members' debtors probably can satisfy deficiency judgments in
 full. When this is the case, a dealer would lose relatively little from mak-
 ing low-price sales and thus would not need to make many low-price
 purchases.
 The probability that a given firm's debtor will enter insolvency is
 difficult for outsiders to assess and is excessively costly for the firm to
 establish convincingly to outsiders. This probability must be inferred
 largely from the particular circumstances of the individual debtor who has
 defaulted rather than, as in the original credit extension, from characteris-
 tics the debtor has in common with many other consumers. Put another
 way, the judgment of whether a person is creditworthy is more likely to be
 made on objective factors, while the judgment of whether a person who
 has missed payments is likely to drown or recover is more likely to be
 made on individual, subjective factors. In consequence, cheating in the
 form of members attempting to make too many low-price purchases from
 and too few low-price sales to the cartel is likely to be common and
 difficult to stop. Also, each cartel member has an incentive to retail some
 cars but to continue making low-price wholesale purchases from the car-
 tel; a creditor who maximizes resale value on his own repossessions but is
 able to purchase goods at artificially depressed wholesale prices will do
 better than "honest" cartel members, who necessarily must make many
 low-price wholesale sales as well as low-price purchases. Because retail
 sales can be made privately and because a dealer probably can conceal or
 explain a failure to make numerous sales to the cartel,47 at least for a time,
 cheating in the form of retailing cars is also likely to occur, especially by
 dealers who are facing hard times that they consider temporary. The
 strong incentives to cheat that dealer cartel members have and the appar-
 ent ease with which cheating can be done suggest that dealer trading
 cartels would be quite unstable.
 Dealer trading cartels, analysis suggests, thus seem not much more
 likely to influence the prices at which repossessed collateral is sold than
 are collusive bidding cartels. No direct evidence of the existence of deal-
 ing trading cartels has been offered, nor is there indirect evidence. In
 particular, dealers seemingly do not claim larger deficiencies than financ-
 ers on similar credit extensions, as they would if dealer trading cartels
 were common.48 If a decision maker nevertheless believed that such car-
 47 When the creditor plans to make a private sale, he must notify only the debtor. See
 UCC ? 9-504(3).
 48 One study reported that deficiencies were no larger than usual when financers resold to
 dealers pursuant to recourse arrangements and the dealers then sued the debtors. See
 Comment, Defaulting Debtors and the Judicial Process, supra note 34. Another study
 showed that deficiencies were lower in this circumstance. See Schuchman, supra note 27, at
 40.
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 tels pose a danger, a legal remedy that would be as effective as and less
 intrusive than the reforms summarized in Section I would be to require
 that all sales be public. Since nonmembers would then learn of the sales,
 they could overbid the cartel for repossessed goods, causing the cartel to
 dissolve. The likelihood that dealer trading cartels exist, however, seems
 too low to justify incurring the costs that would flow from a complete ban
 on private sales.49
 D. Summary
 The belief that creditors systematically fail to maximize the value of
 repossessed collateral has been influential in causing decision makers to
 adopt or propose restrictions on the taking of security interests in con-
 sumer goods. Section 1IA has shown that creditors acting alone have
 incentives only to maximize resale value. Section IIB then demonstrated
 that the practice of many creditors to wholesale rather then retail their
 repossessions is consistent with the view that creditors maximize. In-
 deed, requiring retail sales, as some have proposed, actually would cause
 debtors to pay higher deficiencies than they now do. Finally, Section IIC
 showed that creditors could do better by failing to maximize resale value
 if they could successfully cartelize resale markets. Section IIC went on to
 argue that no persuasive evidence of the existence of creditor cartels
 exists, and that theory suggests that their existence is improbable. In
 consequence of this analysis, public policy should no longer be made on
 the assumption that creditors do not maximize; the assumption must be
 the other way.
 III. REPOSSESSION AND THE ALLEGED DESTRUCTION OF VALUE
 Coercive repossession is said to impose greater harms on debtors than
 it creates gains for creditors. This might occur in four ways. First, debtors
 may value goods in their possession in excess of the goods' market price.
 49 The difficulties discussed above respecting dealer trading cartels seemingly could be
 avoided by secret side payments. For example, if the dealer in the first illustration in Sec.
 IIA sold the $3,000 car for $1,500 and sued for a $3,500 deficiency, but later received a secret
 $500 side payment from the second dealer, he would do $71.51 better than if he sold the car
 for $3,000. No cartel would be necessary; rather the market would have repossessing dealers
 offering cars for less than their actual value to whoever would make the highest side pay-
 ments. But if this were so, the side payments would actually run the other way; the first
 dealer would sell the car for $3,000, its actual price, less the sum the second dealer would
 demand to cooperate in creating a bill of sale that said "$1,500." Apparently no one believes
 that such blatant lying about the prices at which collateral is resold is common. This may be
 because lying would be relatively easy to detect if the repossessing creditor reported the
 difference between the $3,000 actually received and the $1,500 claimed to be received in the
 deficiency action to its shareholders and on its tax returns. On the other hand, the failure to
 report this income is grounds for criminal sanctions.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Tue, 03 Oct 2017 21:49:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 140 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
 For example, a consumer would sell his stereo for no less than $600, but
 its used goods price is $500. When the stereo is repossessed and resold for
 $500, $100 of value allegedly is destroyed. Second, the lack of effective
 resale markets may unduly depress the value of used goods. Suppose that
 the debtor's stereo would be worth at least $500 to anyone who knew how
 reliable it was, such as the debtor himself, but strangers would fear break-
 downs and thus would pay no more than $400 for the stereo. The market
 price for used stereos is artificially depressed because owners know more
 about their goods than outsiders do. In this illustration, the information
 asymmetry causes a $100 value loss because the repossessing creditor
 could sell the stereo for at most $400. Third, repossession could destroy
 human capital. As an example, the stereo may work perfectly if used in a
 certain fashion that the debtor has discovered. When the stereo is repos-
 sessed and resold, the new owner must take time to learn-if he ever does
 learn-how best to use it. In consequence, the debtor's investment in
 learning how to use his stereo is wasted. Fourth, repossession may im-
 pose psychic losses on debtors that are not offset by psychic or other
 gains elsewhere.
 These harms could not occur if debtors were perfectly informed of the
 consequences of granting security. If security imposed greater expected
 harms on debtors than it created expected gains for creditors, creditors
 could not purchase the consent of debtors to grant it; rather, debtors
 would forgo granting security in favor of paying higher interest rates. As
 was noted in the Introduction, this paper assumes instead that consumers
 when they borrow are ignorant of the possibility that repossession could
 impose on them losses such as those just described. If debtors are so
 uninformed and if these losses do occur, repossession would be objection-
 able because it minimizes welfare. Section III next argues, depending on
 the way in which repossession is alleged to impose harm, that no such
 losses occur from it, that no net losses can be shown to occur, or that any
 net losses are trivial.
 The first form of the value destruction claim, that a debtor loses the
 difference between the value he attaches to the goods and their market
 price, seemingly assumes what is to be decided. To see why, let P = the
 collaterals' used goods market price and W be the price that the debtor
 would charge to sell the collateral voluntarily. In the illustration that
 introduced Section III, P = $500 and W = $600; thus repossession im-
 posed a $100 loss on the debtor. However, one can "lose" only what one
 "owns." Suppose that the state had previously decided to confer on
 secured creditors the absolute right to repossess whenever a debtor de-
 faulted. Then the debtor seemingly would lose nothing from repossession
 because after default he would own nothing. The question, that is, appar-
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 ently is whether creditors or debtors have a right to the collateral on
 default, and the initial version of the value destruction claim presupposed
 but did not justify an answer to this question; it simply assumed that
 debtors had the right.
 This version of the value destruction claim can be stated in a noncon-
 clusory way if a debtor who lacked the right to keep the collateral in the
 event of default would bid in excess of its market price to prevent repos-
 session. Let V = the price a debtor would pay to keep the goods if he had
 no legal right to them. Then if V > P, the debtor incurs a value loss even
 though he lacks the property right. Proponents of the value destruction
 claim seemingly suppose the losses that debtors incur from repossession
 to be nontrivial; in the terminology used here, they suppose W - P to be
 large. If they are right, V also is likely to exceed P. This is because the
 price which the debtor would bid for the right to keep the goods (V) is
 unlikely to be very much lower than the price the debtor would choose to
 sell the right (W), so that if the latter is considerably greater than the
 market price (P), the former will exceed the market price also.5o In this
 event, the value destruction claim can be made out independently of
 where the property right is. The debtor's loss is W - P if he owns the
 right and V - P if he does not, with both magnitudes exceeding zero. It is
 a separate question whether in fact both magnitudes are positive, but for
 now this is assumed.
 A complete statement of the initial version of the value destruction
 claim must also explain why a debtor who values goods in excess of their
 market price would ever default. To understand this problem, let D be the
 50 W and V will differ in part because of income effects. If the right to keep particular
 goods on default is a normal good, a debtor would spend the same proportion of his income
 on this right regardless of how much he makes. Because a debtor without the right is
 poorer-by the value of the right-than is a debtor with the right, a debtor without it would
 spend less of his income in dollars to purchase it than he would charge in dollars to give it up.
 The text assumes the right to keep the collateral on default to be a normal good, and so
 suppose W, the ask price, to be greater than V, the bid price, but not very much greater.
 Economists usually assume that income effects of this sort are small because owning a legal
 right is unlikely to add very much to a person's wealth, nor will losing one make a person
 considerably poorer. In consequence, the prices one will pay to keep or to buy a right should
 seldom differ significantly. See Robert D. Willig, Consumer's Surplus without Apology, 66
 Am. Econ. Rev. 589 (1976). Recent evidence, however, suggests that differences between
 bid and ask prices, at least in laboratory settings, commonly are too large to be accounted
 for by income effects alone. See Jack Knetch & Charles Sinden, Willingness.to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures
 of Value, Q. J. Econ., in press (1982). If this evidence generalizes to real cases, the assign-
 ment of legal rights could determine outcomes more frequently than is commonly supposed.
 For example, repossession could destroy value if the debtor is assumed to own the right, W
 > P, but may not destroy value if the creditor has the right, V < P. If this outcome seems
 possible, the assignment of rights must be independently justified. Section V, infra, does
 consider noninstrumentalist justifications for assigning the right to the debtor.
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 outstanding debt, which is the unpaid portion of the price, with V and P
 being defined as above. Suppose the debtor's circumstances have
 changed after a sale such that he comes to believe that the goods are
 worth less to him than the unpaid price; for example, the debtor has
 become unemployed and would rather spend scarce resources on rent
 than on stereo payments. In this event, the debtor has an incentive to
 abandon the deal because the goods are worth less to him than the out-
 standing debt (D > V). Repossession and a deficiency action would also
 disadvantage him. As an example, let D = $650, V = $590, and P = $500.
 If the creditor repossesses and resells, he will sue for D - P = $150. If
 the creditor can sue only for the debt, the debtor's loss is the debt less the
 value of the goods the debtor retains, D - V = $60. Thus repossession
 and a suit for the deficiency impose an additional $90 loss on the debtor.
 However, if the debtor believed with certainty that the creditor would sue
 for D - P, he seemingly would not default; rather, he would retain the
 goods and pay D, although D > V, because this cuts his loss to D - V,
 which is $60 here.
 It thus is difficult to explain default when debtors value the collateral at
 more than its market price. A debtor might believe that his creditor will
 repossess but not sue because deficiencies are sought in a minority of
 cases; if the debtor is correct, default gains him the difference between
 the outstanding debt and the value he attaches to the goods. Also, default
 enables the debtor to reallocate his resources to meet immediate needs.
 The benefit of being able to do this may sometimes exceed the net loss
 that repossession plus a deficiency action impose.51
 It is now possible to state the initial version of the value destruction
 claim completely: If (1) debtors would ask a sum in excess of the collat-
 eral's used goods market price to allow a creditor to repossess on default,
 W - P > 0; or (2) debtors would bid a sum in excess of the used goods
 market price to retain the collateral in this event, V - P > 0; and (3)
 debtors routinely default when the utility they would derive from retain-
 ing the unpaid portion of the price exceeds the utility they would derive
 from retaining the goods, D > W or V, then repossession causes debtors
 to lose value. Further, if (4) creditors necessarily derive less value from
 51 Another form of the value destruction claim that is sometimes made is that consumers
 lose the goods' replacement value while creditors recover only the used goods market price.
 If replacement value is conceived of as this used goods' market price, this form of the claim
 adds nothing to what has been said; the consumer can replace his used goods with other used
 goods, paying P, and so loses V - P. If replacement value is conceived of as the new goods
 price, this version of the claim is false. Consumers default when the value to them of
 retaining the goods is less than the unpaid price (D > V). Since the new goods price must
 exceed D, consumers would not buy new goods and so would not lose the new goods
 replacement value.
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 repossessed goods than debtors lose and (5) repossession does not other-
 wise create value, repossession also causes net social harms.
 The latter two assumptions seem less likely to hold than the first three.
 Respecting 'assumption 4, consider the repossessing creditor in his status
 as a seller of used goods. Firms commonly are assumed to sell until
 marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Most units that are sold, however,
 are inframarginal; they bring in revenue in excess of cost. Suppose then
 that (a) the market price of a used item is $500; (b) the defaulting debtor
 would pay $590 for the right to retain the item; (c) the product when
 repossessed and resold is inframarginal to the creditor, bringing in reve-
 nue of $120 over costs; and (d) the debtor and creditor have the same
 marginal utility for money. In this circumstance, repossession actually
 creates a net social gain; the creditor gains $30 of utility more than the
 debtor loses. In actual cases, it would be impossible to know whether
 repossession creates net social gains of this sort. This is because the
 parties probably will have different marginal utilities for money, but these
 utilities as well as the debtors' bid and ask prices are unobservable. The
 point of the illustration rather is to show that the creditor's net gain from
 repossession and resale is not necessarily less than the debtor's loss.
 Assumption 5 above also is unlikely to hold because second buyers
 commonly value resold goods in excess of their price. This point is made
 clearly with a graph (Figure 1). The curves S (supply) and D (demand) are
 for used goods when the debtor decides that the goods are worth less to
 him than the unpaid portion of the price. The debtor in this illustration is
 located at point A on the supply curve S; this means, supposing him to
 P
 Q
 FIGURE 1
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 have the property right, that he would not sell the collateral at its used
 goods market price, P*, but would sell if the price rose to P'. The differ-
 ence between these two prices, P' - P*, is the debtor's loss from repos-
 session, in the sense at issue here. The second buyer is located at point B
 on the demand curve D; this means that he would buy the product if its
 price were as high as P'. The difference between this price and the market
 price at which he is able to purchase, P1 - P*, is the second buyer's gain.
 In this illustration, these gains and losses exactly offset one another, but
 they need not; considering just the debtor and second buyer, repossession
 and resale could create net social gains or losses, depending on the valua-
 tions the parties attach to the goods. Unfortunately, these valuations are
 unobservable, but the point is the same; repossession does not necessar-
 ily destroy value.
 To summarize, if the debtor's loss from repossession is conceptualized
 as the difference between the price for which the debtor would buy or sell
 the right to keep the collateral and the collateral's market price, reposses-
 sion would create net social losses only if the debtor's loss typically
 exceeds the creditor's and second buyer's gain. Decision makers cannot
 know whether this is the case. From a utilitarian perspective, however,
 the analysis does show the fallacy of a claim that repossession necessarily
 creates net social losses because debtors always lose value. Also, if
 speculation is fair, repossession may create net social gains. This is be-
 cause debtors seem more likely to default when they care relatively less
 about retaining possession. The smaller the debtor's loss, the more likely
 it is to be outweighed by the gains repossession creates for the creditor
 and second buyer.
 The second version of the value destruction claim asserts that reposses-
 sion creates greater harms than gains in consequence of the rapid and
 extensive depreciation to which consumer goods often are subject. This
 depreciation allegedly is a function of the absence of effective resale
 markets for used consumer goods. It is said to destroy value because
 repossessed goods are "worth" more than the unduly low prices they
 command.52
 Two factors apparently contribute most to the depreciation of con-
 sumer goods, neither of which supports the conclusion that repossession
 destroys value. First, new goods command a premium partly because of
 their newness; consumers want the experience of the first few drives in a
 new car or the first views of a new television. Because each such experi-
 ence can be had only once, when they are important new goods will sell
 52 This claim is commonly made. See "Credit Practices," supra note 28, at 227, 321 and
 authorities cited in n. 189, id. See also Whitford, supra note 10.
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 for much more than used goods. Although the premium that new goods
 command may sometimes be large because of the "newness" factor,
 repossession cannot destroy value in this sense. The debtor, being the
 first buyer, by then has consumed the relevant good; he has exhausted the
 product's newness. Thus he loses nothing when the product is taken and
 resold at a discount that reflects its used goods character.
 A second factor that may contribute to the allegedly excessive depreci-
 ation of consumer goods collateral is a function of the greater probability
 that these goods will fail and of the inability of buyers to observe this
 probability. To understand the possible effect of the resultant information
 asymmetry, suppose that cars are of two kinds, good ones and bad ones,
 but that consumers cannot tell the difference before they purchase. After
 use, a consumer knows which kind of car he has. An information asym-
 metry has then developed, since car owners know more than (used) car
 buyers about vehicle quality. In this circumstance, price within a model
 class will reflect consumer views of average car quality. If consumers
 supposed average quality to be higher than it is, the market would be
 swamped with bad cars, offered for sale at the "good car price." Consum-
 ers probably are aware of this possibility, however, and when they lack
 information about actual quality will suppose average quality to be rela-
 tively low. A person owning a car whose quality is above this perceived
 average is therefore locked in. His car is worth more than the market
 price, yet that price is all he can get for it. More to the point, when this
 debtor's car is repossessed, it will be resold at the market price. If the
 debtor had a good car, and more cars are likely to be above the perceived
 average than below it, repossession would inflict harm on the debtor in
 excess of the price the car can command in the market.53 Also, this harm
 occurs independent of which party is assumed to have a right to the goods
 in the event of default. If the debtor has the right, he suffers harm in the
 fashion just described. If the creditor has the right, the information asym-
 metry prevents the creditor from selling the goods at their "true" value;
 in consequence, the deficiency that the debtor will have to pay is in-
 creased.
 Although debtors sometimes may lose value in the sense at issue here
 when goods are repossessed, for three reasons the conclusion that repos-
 session creates net social harms does not follow. First, the quality of
 some used goods, such as furniture, seems observable before purchase.
 53 This argument is drawn from George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Qualita-
 tive Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970). For a recent
 treatment of the theory, see Charles Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with
 Adverse Selection, 11 Bell J. Econ. 108 (1980).
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 As to this collateral, the information asymmetry on which the argument
 rests does not exist. Second, when a good repossessed car is offered for
 sale, the percentage of good cars in the market has increased, although
 potential car buyers do not know this. A buyer of this repossessed car
 thus gets a windfall, an above average car at the "average" price. This
 gain must be set against the loss that the debtor suffered; depending on
 the parties' preferences, repossession again could create net social gains
 or losses. For example, if the debtor used the car occasionally for recre-
 ational use but the second buyer was a traveling salesman, the second
 buyer probably would gain more from owning an above average car than
 the debtor would lose by being without one. Third, market institutions
 often will correct for the information asymmetry, so that the prices of
 repossessed items will reflect their actual value. Such institutions include
 guarantees and the concern of sellers for their reputations. As an example
 of their possible effectiveness, a recent study of the market for used
 pickup trucks supposed that if the information asymmetry just discussed
 did in fact exist, owners of high maintenance trucks would exploit it by
 selling them in the used market; hence, this partial consumer market-59
 percent of pickups are used for personal transportation-would be a
 "market for lemons." The study reported, however, "that trucks that
 were purchased used required no more maintenance than trucks of similar
 age that had not been traded."54 Institutions such as guarantees thus will
 often prevent debtors from losing value in the sense at issue here.
 54 See Eric Bond, A Direct Test of the "Lemons" Model: The Market for Used Pickup
 Trucks, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 836 (1982). This information problem could also be less serious
 than is commonly thought if debtors are more likely to default when they own bad cars. See
 also Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J. Law & Econ.
 27 (1982). Commentators sometimes attribute the value loss debtors may suffer to the
 absence of well-developed markets for used goods (see authorities cited note 52, supra) but
 the alleged absence of such markets is not explained. A market for private goods could fail to
 arise for supply side reasons, such as barriers to entry, or demand side reasons, such as
 consumers' unwillingness to pay enough to have the product be produced. Supply side
 obstacles to the formation of used goods markets seem slight, for entry into retail markets is
 relatively cheap. The text discusses two demand side obstacles, that consumers want only to
 purchase "newness" and that information asymmetries may make consumers reluctant to
 purchase. Neither obstacle seems serious enough to support the value destruction claim.
 Also, the assumption that viable resale markets for used goods do not exist seems over-
 drawn. Two investigators sampled 203 households in the Cedar Rapids, Iowa, area to see
 what percentage of consumer durables in each home were used. See Dean Roussos &
 Leonard Konopa, Ownership Levels, Acquisition and Disposition Channels of Selected
 Consumer Durable Used-Goods, 8 Akron Bus. & Econ. Rev. 30 (1977). They found that
 18.49 percent of the durable goods owned by the sample were used. Some 55.6 percent of
 these were purchased, the remainder being gifts. Also, 15.6 percent of the used goods were
 purchased from "Business Firms or other Institutions"; that is, approximately 3 percent of
 the durables owned by the sample were bought used from institutions. Considering the very
 large number of consumer durables that Americans own, these figures suggest that used
 goods markets for such frequently repossessed items as major appliances, boats, dressers,
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 The third way in which repossession is said to destroy value is through
 the destruction of human capital that repossession creates. To see how
 this could occur, suppose the debtor owns a car that always starts if
 treated in a certain way but will not start in cold weather if treated other-
 wise. The car is then repossessed and resold but the second buyer is
 ignorant of its character. The investment the debtor made in learning how
 to use the car is thus destroyed, with no offsetting gain.5
 Value is lost when human capital is destroyed in this way, but the losses
 seem occasional and slight for three reasons. First, human capital will not
 exist respecting many consumer goods. There is no trick to making a
 couch work. Second, people seldom need tricks to make new goods work.
 This is partly because they often do work. When they do not-a new car
 does not start in cold weather-the goods commonly are fixed under
 warranty or a disadvantaged buyer has the right to revoke his acceptance.
 Because repossessed goods often are nearly new-default can occur only
 during the payment period-debtors seldom will have invested human
 capital in learning how to use them.56 Third, most consumers lack techni-
 cal skills. In consequence, the methods they develop to make used goods
 work commonly are easy to discover. Thus the second buyer in the illus-
 tration above should quickly learn how to start the car. These three rea-
 sons taken together show that the destruction of human capital inherent in
 repossession is too trivial to support extensive restrictions on security
 interests in consumer goods.
 In summary, if the harm that repossession imposes on debtors is con-
 ceptualized in "economic" terms-debtors lose human capital or the
 difference between the goods' value to them and its price-repossession
 imposes trivial harms, no harms at all, or harms that cannot be shown to
 exceed the gains, depending on how one considers the harm to have been
 inflicted. Under none of these outcomes is the welfare-minimizing objec-
 tion to repossession persuasive.
 If "psychic" rather than "economic" costs are considered, debtors
 could suffer losses from repossession not offset by gains elsewhere, at
 tables, and musical instruments do exist. The authors concluded: "Such suppositions as: (a)
 the ownership of durable used-goods is essentially a characteristic of the economically
 deprived in our society; and (b) householders typically eschew used-durables because they
 do not want 'other people's castoff second-hand durables or troubles,' are not supported by
 the data" (id. at 33-34).
 55 Professor Leff first made this claim. See Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-
 the Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 Yale L. J. 1 (1970).
 56 This observation is more true of purchase money security than of security interests that
 lenders take in their debtors' existing possessions, for some of these possessions will not be
 new.
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 least in theory. Suppose that debtors are humiliated when creditors fore-
 close on liened property. Then if (1) creditors derive no pleasure from
 repossessing other than the pleasure of reducing the debt; (2) buyers of
 repossessed goods derive no pleasure from knowing (if they do know) that
 the goods were repossessed; and (3) debtors would regard the withholding
 of a portion of their wages from each paycheck-garnishment-as less
 humiliating than repossession, coercive property execution imposes psy-
 chic harms not offset by gains elsewhere.57
 This line of attack against repossession is unconvincing given present
 understanding of the phenomenon. Initially, whether repossession creates
 net psychic losses is uncertain. Assumption 1 above is problematic and
 assumption 3 is more so, for while the debtor's family and close friends
 would know whether garnishment or repossession has occurred, garnish-
 ments seem at least as public as repossessions, since garnishments be-
 come known to the debtor's employer and co-workers. Further, banning
 repossesion entails costs. Under current law, creditors have the choice of
 repossession or garnishment. That many creditors choose the former
 method suggests that it sometimes has advantages over the latter.58 Ban-
 ning repossession thus will create costs that must be set against any
 psychic losses that repossession may cause. Precisely comparing these
 sets of costs seems impossible so a utilitarian case against repossession is
 unpersuasive even when psychic costs are considered. Finally, in the
 absence of a coherent claim that repossessions impose greater dignitary
 harms on persons than garnishments, a fairness case against reposses-
 sion, on the ground that it inevitably is disrespectful to persons, is not
 compelling.
 IV. IN TERROREM REPOSSESSIONS
 The disapproval of security in consumer contexts rests partly on the
 belief that creditors do not take security to raise revenue in the usual
 sense-through foreclosure and resale. Instead, creditors use the threat
 57 For an argument along these lines, see George J. Wallace, The Logic of Consumer
 Credit Reform, 82 Yale L. J. 461 (1973).
 58 Income execution-that is, garnishment-has higher procedural costs than private
 repossessions because courts are involved. Also, income execution is a time-consuming
 collection method, especially for large claims, because the law prevents creditors from
 taking more than 25 percent of the debtor's take-home pay per paycheck. Consumer Credit
 Protection Act ? 303(a) (1968). This delay imposes two sorts of costs: (1) if creditors earn
 more with money than the legal rate of interest, delay creates opportunity cost losses; (2)
 delay also increases the likelihood that debtors will go bankrupt and thus erase part (or all) of
 the debt. In addition, although it is unlawful for an employer to dismiss an employee whose
 wages have been garnished only once, employers are commonly believed often to dismiss or
 otherwise sanction garnished employees. This is a cost peculiar to income execution.
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 of foreclosure to coerce payment.59 The belief that security functions
 primarily as an in terrorem device is linked to the two justifications dis-
 cussed above: because creditors are indifferent to the returns that foreclo-
 sure brings (the failure to maximize claim) and because repossessed goods
 are worth little (version 2 of the destruction-of-value claim) creditors must
 take security only for its threat value. That creditors commonly so act
 should now seem less plausible, but the issue here is whether in terrorem
 repossessions are blameworthy, however often done. In this Section I
 argue that some of the concerns that seemingly animate the distaste for in
 terrorem repossessions are misplaced and others are unpersuasive.
 Before reaching the analysis, it is helpful to define an in terrorem repos-
 session. Suppose that creditors repossess only when the gains to them
 from doing so exceed the costs. Let these gains be direct and indirect:
 direct gains derive from resale revenues; indirect gains derive from the
 expected improvement in the creditor's collection experience because
 each actual repossession makes more credible the creditor's constant
 threat to impose costs on nonpayers. An in terrorem repossession then
 occurs when repossession costs exceed the direct gains but are less than
 the sum of direct and indirect gains. This definition captures the allegedly
 objectionable feature of in terrorem repossessions-that they would not
 be made except for their value in establishing credible threats. The
 definition also rests on the premise that repossessions cannot be objec-
 tionable, in the sense at issue here, when their direct gains exceed their
 direct costs, even though they may produce indirect gains. This is be-
 cause the debtor's agreement to give security implies his consent to the
 use of security for its plainly legitimate purpose-to reduce the outstand-
 ing debt.
 In terrorem repossessions may be thought improper for ex ante reasons
 (it is wrong for creditors to coerce payment by threatening foreclosure) or
 for ex post reasons (it is wrong for creditors to make examples of debtors
 who differ in no relevant respects from those whose goods are un-
 touched). Regulating security is an inappropriate response to the first set
 of concerns. The alleged evil of threats to take the collateral at once is that
 the threats may cause debtors to forgo defenses to the underlying claim.
 These defenses are of two kinds: reasons not to pay that are sufficient
 59 A typical statement of this view asserts that nonpurchase money security interests
 "equip a creditor with a capacity to threaten the consumer with extreme deprivation to
 induce the consumer to acquiesce to the creditor's demands whether or not the demands are
 reasonable." Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 193-94. See also id. at 210-11; J. Spanogle
 and R. Rohner, Consumer Law Cases and Materials 328 (1979); Whitford, supra note 10;
 H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95 Cong. 1st Sess. 126-27 (1977) (discussing ? 522(f)(2) of the Bank-
 ruptcy Code).
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 under current law, such as a creditor's breach of warranty, and reasons
 not to pay that "in good conscience" should prevail, such as the debtor's
 illness. The response that is called for by the former concern is to require
 creditors to justify their claims to an impartial third party and to permit
 debtors to assert defenses before the goods can be repossessed. This is
 best done by means of a preliminary hearing, such as may be constitution-
 ally required when creditors attach property under the authority of state
 statutes rather than private contracts.60 In light of the very small percent-
 age of debtors who could raise tenable legal defenses to a claim of foreclo-
 sure, prohibiting foreclosure altogether or making it materially more
 difficult are responses that seem disproportionate to the alleged evil.
 Critics of security also are concerned with "moral" defenses to non-
 payment. The literature supporting regulation often contains claims that
 debtors fail to pay largely because of circumstances beyond their control,
 such as illness or unemployment.61 The premise underlying these claims
 apparently is that it is too harsh to make debtors who have suffered such
 misfortune choose between payment or repossession. Regulating repos-
 sessions is an inappropriate response to this concern because the concern
 60 The constitutional requirements are described in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
 600 (1974). A hearing is not constitutionally required when the creditor repossesses pursuant
 to a Code security interest. For example, Adams v. Southern California First National
 Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). See also Flagg Bros.,
 Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 199 (1978). The Model Consumer Credit Act (1973), drafted by the
 National Consumer Law Center, requires repossession to be by legal action, ? 7.202, but no
 state has adopted this statute. Wisconsin has come close, requiring repossession to be by
 action unless "the customer has surrendered the collateral." Wisconsin Consumer Act
 ? 425.206(1)(b) (1973). A surrender "is not . . . voluntary" if it is "made pursuant to" the
 creditor's "request or demand" or "pursuant to a threat, statement or notice by the . . .
 [creditor] that [he] . . . intends to take possession of the collateral." Id. at ? 425.204(3). The
 text does not advocate hearings prior to repossession; instead, it claims that if threats to
 repossess in fact cause many consumers to forgo legal defenses, the appropriate remedy is a
 hearing, not the regulation of security. A major debate took place in the 1970s-over whether
 a hearing should be constitutionally required when creditors attached goods pursuant to
 state statute. Opponents of the requirement argued that debtors seldom had good defenses
 and that hearings would be excessively costly; proponents disputed both assertions and
 claimed that consumers had a dignitary interest that unregulated attachment could violate. A
 representative exchange is Robert W. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Eco-
 nomic Analysis, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 82 (1973); Edward A. Dauer & Thomas K. Gilhool, The
 Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a
 Partial Reply, id. at 116; Robert W. Johnson, A Response to Dauer and Gilhool: A Defense
 of Self-Help Repossession, id. at 151. See also Robert E. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of
 Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 Va. L. Rev. 807
 (1975).
 61 See, for example, Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 236. The market allows debtors to
 insure against some of these harms: credit life and health insurance, for example, are
 frequently offered in connection with extensions of credit to consumers, and protect them
 against many of the hardships that unexpected illness could cause.
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 actually goes to the circumstances under which payment should be ex-
 cused. It is best to focus directly on the excuse issue rather than treat it
 obliquely by restricting security. To see why, suppose that involuntary
 unemployment is a proper excusing circumstance.62 Current restrictions
 on the taking of security permit a secured creditor to foreclose if he then
 eschews a suit on the debt or to sue but forgo foreclosure. The secured
 creditor thus can collect at least some of the debt even though security is
 regulated. If unemployment should excuse payment, however, the cred-
 itor should receive nothing. Suppose instead that unemployment does not
 excuse default. Then restrictions on security are unfair, because they
 often cause creditors to be paid less than in full although debtors have no
 legitimate excuse for defaulting. It is, in short, unwise to respond to the
 excuse issue by regulating security, because such regulation seemingly
 insures only that debtors will have to pay too much or too little.
 The second set of objections to in terrorem repossessions focuses on
 their property of making examples of particular debtors. This concern has
 two aspects. The first is an expectations objection: the debtor whose
 goods are taken could not reasonably think it would be he who would
 suffer. The second is an equality claim: many debtors fail to pay; no good
 reason exists to punish this debtor. Neither claim is persuasive. Respect-
 ing expectations, the signing of a security agreement is notice to the
 debtor that the goods may be taken if he fails to pay. Also, creditors have
 incentives to overstate the frequency with which they foreclose, and
 probably they often do so. In these circumstances, each debtor should
 and likely does know that repossession is a live prospect. Thus claims of
 unfair surprise will seldom be tenable.
 The equality claim is not compelling because good reasons exist to
 make in terrorem repossessions, supposing them to occur. They may
 encourage repayment at least cost to debtors as a group because creditors
 have incentives to use cost-minimizing collection methods. If one such
 method is banned a more costly one will be used, and debtors will bear
 part of the resultant cost increase. If the threat of repossession is the
 least-cost method and is to be effective, some repossessions must be
 made. The question then becomes whether the equality goal-all debtors
 are relevantly alike and thus all or none should be foreclosed against-
 should take precedence over the group welfare and desert goals-
 consumers generally benefit from selective foreclosure and this debtor
 deserves to be foreclosed against because he did not pay. In the criminal
 62 That unanticipated financial hardship should excuse default is considered in George J.
 Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings Reexamined, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 451, 468-70
 (1976).
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 law, the equality goal-all persons who commit crimes should be simi-
 larly prosecuted and punished-is subordinated to the group welfare and
 desert goals; no one has a right to avoid conviction because a similar
 perpetrator was not prosecuted. This principle becomes controversial in
 only two circumstances: when the state proceeds against persons partly
 with the goal of using their punishment to deter others but punishes them
 in a drastic and irreversible fashion such as by execution;63 or when
 resource constraints enable the state to proceed against only a subset of
 suspected criminals and the subset is selected by disfavored criteria such
 as race. A defaulting debtor whose goods are taken for deterrence reasons
 has prima facie no better claim of excuse than the burglar who is fairly
 caught. Most burglars are not caught, but this burglar actually committed
 the crime, and burglary is a bad action that may be reduced by conviction.
 By the same reasoning, the debtor failed to pay, and unjustified nonpay-
 ment is a bad action that may be reduced by foreclosure. In addition,
 relevant differences often may exist between debtors whose goods are
 taken and those who escape. Creditors have incentives to preserve good
 will while collecting debts. These incentives should lead them to make in
 terrorem repossessions only against obvious deadbeats, and creditors
 claim to proceed, in the contexts in which in terrorem repossessions are
 said to occur, primarily against persons who do not pay without even the
 moral excuses discussed above.
 V. PROPERTY RIGHTS OBJECTIONS TO SECURITY
 The justifications for regulating security discussed above, in particular
 the claims that repossession destroys value or is done for in terrorem
 motives, seem animated by a set of inchoate moral concerns. Allowing
 creditors to take unrestricted security interests in consumer goods is felt
 unjustifiably to deprive persons of property, but those who believe this
 have yet to show how their belief follows from current normative concep-
 tions of the sources of property rights. In consequence of the belief and
 this failure, critics of security often cast moral objections to it in the more
 familiar language of economics. These objections should be evaluated
 directly. Section V attempts to explicate theories of property rights from
 which objections to unregulated security could tenably be derived; it then
 argues that these objections cannot support present regulation.64
 63 See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
 Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980).
 64 The literature supporting the reforms discussed here seldom explicitly justifies them on
 distributional grounds, but a distributional theme may underlie the case for regulation. If so,
 for two related reasons the theme is inappropriate. The supply of consumer credit probably
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 Two preliminary matters should be clarified before reaching the analy-
 sis. First, the argument assumes: (1) people understand that to give a
 security interest means to authorize the creditor to repossess the specified
 collateral in the event of nonpayment; (2) consumer credit contracts are
 set forth in readily understandable language and requisite disclosures are
 made in such fashion as to be easily acted on; and (3) consumer credit
 markets are competitive. These assumptions are made, not because they
 are true, but to focus attention on the question whether security is morally
 objectionable in relatively ideal circumstances. Regulation to cure the
 problems generated by the failure of any of these assumptions to obtain in
 actual markets has familiar justifications that can be derived from contract
 law doctrines.
 Second, recent legislation in this area has been influenced by a belief
 that consumers in unregulated markets put their property too much at
 risk. This belief is partly responsible for two kinds of regulation: restric-
 tions on the granting of security belong to the class that directly limits risk
 taking; relaxed requirements for becoming a bankrupt and expanded
 bankruptcy exemptions,65 in contrast, ameliorate the consequences of
 risk taking. An ideal treatment of any particular aspect of this legislation
 would consider both types of responses to risk taking because they may
 be related. For example, decision makers could want to relax restrictions
 on risk taking initially because, through bankruptcy legislation, they have
 minimized the consequences that risk taking creates. This paper never-
 theless only discusses an aspect of risk-limiting regulation. This is be-
 cause the subject of risk taking in consumer transactions seems too broad
 and complex to be treated as a whole, given present levels of understand-
 ing; rather, the best chance of understanding it lies in making detailed
 analyses of various of its parts.
 is elastic in relation to the demand; that is, credit suppliers apparently can sell money in
 nonconsumer markets more conveniently than consumers, especially low-income consum-
 ers, can forgo debt. This being so, much of the cost of regulation will be passed on to debtors
 in the form of higher prices, reduced credit availability, or less favored purchase terms.
 There are two reasons why this outcome is unsatisfactory. First, because much of the cost is
 passed on, the resultant redistribution is less from creditors to debtors than among the
 debtors themselves. The defaulters gain at the expense of those who pay higher interest
 rates or are denied credit. To the extent that default is within the control of debtors-
 persons can borrow wisely or otherwise manage their affairs appropriately-requiring "in-
 nocent" consumers to subsidize defaulters seems difficult to justify. Second, credit markets
 are believed to segment; the middle class and rich commonly buy and borrow from different
 firms from the poor. Thus wealth is unlikely to be redistributed across class lines, but rather
 within social classes. See Whitford, supra note 10. Poor consumers who pay higher interest
 rates or are denied credit subsidize poor consumers who default. This outcome seemingly
 taxes the wrong group.
 65 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. ? 522(f); ? 1325(a)(5).
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 An analysis of property rights objections to the taking of security must
 focus on the relationship that people have to physical things. The prin-
 cipal coercive collection devices used in consumer transactions are gar-
 nishment and foreclosure. Restrictions on the taking of security will in-
 crease the use of garnishments. Since it is assumed here that collecting
 debts is an innocent activity in the absence of a bankruptcy proceeding,
 the question then becomes whether security poses a greater threat to
 property rights than garnishment does. It is this question that requires
 an inquiry into the possible evils of creditors taking things rather than
 money.
 Two related theories of property rights, both of which derive from the
 effect on personal autonomy of the possession of things, seem germane.
 The first is a welfare rights theory which holds that each person needs an
 irreducible minimum of physical things in order to lead a full and autono-
 mous life. Such a life cannot be led by one destitute of possessions. If the
 state were to sanction the taking of everything a person owns, it would
 therefore be permitting the destruction of his ability to be a full member of
 society. To treat persons in this way poses a threat to the community's
 viability and also is impermissibly disrespectful to them. In consequence,
 the state should ensure that people will always retain the requisite
 minimum of possessions.66 The second theory focuses more directly on
 the relation of people to physical objects, holding that people partly con-
 stitute themselves through their possession of tangible things; people, in
 effect, are at least partly what they own. Much property that people own
 obviously is "fungible"-a toaster or a tire iron-but some property is
 "personal" in the sense that the possessor's personality is bound up with
 owning it-a wedding ring or a home. The same property may be fungible
 to one owner and personal to another because people invest themselves in
 different kinds of things, but the relevant point is that some property is
 personal in a wholesome rather than a fetishistic sense. If the state were
 to allow the taking of anything a person may own, it must necessarily
 allow the taking of personal property; this could result in the destruction
 of important aspects of people's personalities. Because people have a
 right to be whole, they have a right to own those things in which their
 wholeness partly resides.67
 Both of these theories accord people rights to things that are good
 against (at least some forms of) involuntary divestment. The issue in this
 "66 Legal analyses of welfare rights theories are found in Thomas C. Grey, Property and
 Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 877 (1976);
 Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. L. Q. 659.
 67 This second theory is set out in Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982). It has Hegelian roots.
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 context, however, is alienability: can a person voluntarily pledge his re-
 frigerator or his father's watch as security for a loan?68 In answering this
 question, it is helpful to distinguish between security interests of this sort
 and purchase-money security interests, which are taken by sellers or
 lenders to secure the purchase price. Purchase-money security interests
 are common in connection with installment sales of consumer goods. It
 would be contradictory of the property rights theories just set out to
 prohibit them. If people prefer to give purchase-money security interests
 rather than pay higher interest rates or cash prices, making purchase-
 money security less attractive to creditors will compel people to forgo
 purchases or will increase their difficulty in purchasing. Respecting the
 welfare rights theory, it is contradictory to increase the costs to a person
 of assembling the irreducible minimum of goods necessary to his leading a
 full and autonomous life in the name of enabling him to lead that life.
 Respecting the second theory, it is contradictory to increase the difficulty
 a person has in buying goods that will become a part of himself in the
 name of protecting his interest in goods that are a part of himself. Because
 both relevant property theories protect people's rights to own things,
 these theories seemingly should permit persons to alienate-to mort-
 gage-goods when alienation will materially increase the opportunity for
 ownership. Moral objections to the giving of security thus must inhere in
 the unrelatedness of security to acquisition; people can give purchase-
 68 Modern property theory recognizes three sources of property rights, broadly speaking.
 One source derives from the Lockean notion that a person owns things in virtue of his
 mixing his labor with them; a second derives from utilitarianism, holding that rights should
 be assigned in such fashion as to maximize utility; and the third derives, in a more or less
 immediate sense, from concern for individual personality, assigning rights to people in such
 ways as to preserve or create their ability to be fully free. This paper speaks only of the third
 source of property rights because the relevant legal issue is when people can alienate things.
 Lockean theory seemingly assumes a virtually untrammeled right of alienation. Once one
 has acquired rights in a thing, by mixing one's labor with it, nothing internal to the theory
 supports restricting the person's power to exchange that thing for another. In addition,
 Locke seemingly justifies property rights partly by recourse to utilitarian reasons, after
 money has been invented; in a world with money, the institution of private property is
 justifiable partly because it increases social utility. See S. D. Drury, Locke and Nozick on
 Property, 30 Pol. Stud. 28 (1982). Utilitarianism also supports a broad power to alienate,
 especially if the modern view that people can best choose the actions that maximize their
 own utility is accepted. For then voluntary exchanges must be permitted, on the ground
 that they are made only when they maximize the utility of the parties to them. In contrast to
 Lockean and utilitarian theories, an unrestrained power to alienate could erode the basis of
 the property right itself when that right derives from notions of individual personality. This
 is because persons, at least in theory, could alienate property necessary to their leading
 autonomous lives or necessary to their personhood. The support that personality theories of
 property provide to restraints on alienation may partly explain why objections to freedom of
 contract in consumer contexts sometimes have a welfare rights tone. The text thus attempts
 to show that even personality theories cannot sustain present regulation of consumer goods
 security.
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 money security interests but perhaps should not be allowed to mortgage
 what is already theirs.
 The conclusion that broad security interests in consumer goods should
 be restricted does not follow from the notion of unrelatedness alone. To
 see why, recall that people now are free to sell their possessions: a person
 can convert the irreducible minimum of goods to cash or sell "the old
 home place."'69 This freedom is only partly justified by administrative
 convenience, for institutions such as conservatorships exist or could be
 fashioned to prevent people from selling all their goods. Rather, the free-
 dom to sell is also justified by notions of personal autonomy. Should these
 notions permit sales but prevent mortgages?
 Answers seemingly must derive from the uncertainties that attend the
 mortgage decision. One such answer may run like this: a person deciding
 whether to make a present sale of his property can know what affect on
 his life being without the goods at issue will have. More accurately, be-
 cause the effects of a sale are felt immediately, a person can predict his
 reaction to these effects as well as he can predict his reaction to any
 action he will take. The decision to mortgage, in contrast, requires a
 person to predict the affect on his life of the later forcible removal of many
 of his possessions or a significant few. The effects of repossession, how-
 ever, may be incommensurable in the sense that one must experience it to
 know it. In consequence, people cannot asssess adequately the threat to
 their autonomy posed by mortgages. If people underestimate this threat,
 an unregulated right to mortgage will permit them heedlessly to imperil
 their autonomy by putting their possessions too much at risk.
 This justification for limiting the ability to mortgage rests on a factual
 premise that is difficult to test. If people have no appreciation at all of the
 consequences of giving security, regulating it is uncontroversial. On the
 other hand, if people have as full an appreciation of what it means to
 mortgage as to sell, unrestricted mortgages should be allowed. No one
 knows, however, what people actually understand or need to understand
 about the mortgage decision, in the sense of understanding now at issue,
 nor is it clear how the relevant facts could be obtained. When the ultimate
 question is factual but the facts are very hard to get, it is often sensible to
 resolve the matter by considering the consequences of assigning to one or
 the other position the burden of persuasion. Section V next makes three
 arguments in support of the view that people should be allowed to mort-
 69 See Hutchins v. Honeycutt, 286 N.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 254 (1974). Some courts have
 suggested that the power to sell implies the power to mortgage, this being "a less drastic step
 of encumbering . . . property." State v. AVCO Fin. Services, 50 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 406
 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (1980). See also Commarano v. Longmire, 99 Wash. 360, 169 P. 806
 (1918).
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 gage whatever they are allowed to sell, at least until further facts about
 the mortgage decision are developed. These arguments have a common
 theme, which is that the restrictions on personal autonomy that seem to
 flow from constricting people's ability to transact are unacceptable unless
 the autonomy-enhancing effects of a limited right to transact are plain.
 Because these latter effects are obscure in this context, the property
 rights objections to limiting security that are discussed here should fall.
 The first argument is that the uncertainties which attend the decision to
 mortgage are not unique. Our society allows people to make many deci-
 sions that affect their futures in an important way, such as where and at
 what to work, whom to marry, whether to have children, whether to be
 soldiers, and where to live. People seem equally well equipped to evaluate
 the potentially adverse consequences to them of borrowing on the
 strength of a used car. Nor do these consequences appear graver than
 those people face in other areas where autonomy is given scope. Until
 new facts shatter the commonsense intuition that the mortgage decision is
 relevantly similar to decisions that people can now freely make, people
 should be allowed to mortgage.
 The second argument is concerned more directly with the potentially
 contradictory effects on autonomy that flow from restrictions on the abil-
 ity to transact. These restrictions could increase autonomy, in the sense
 of enabling people to keep a necessary minimum of goods or a particularly
 important few, but the restrictions also decrease autonomy by diminish-
 ing the set of transactions people can make. It is argued below that lim-
 iting the ability to give security decreases the autonomy of poor persons,
 in this latter sense, more than that of middle-class persons. The auton-
 omy-enhancing effect of this regulation, however, is difficult to assess.
 When the autonomy-increasing effect of regulation is unclear but its au-
 tonomy-decreasing effect seems both clear and especially burdensome to
 a group commonly thought most in need of help, the regulation is unwar-
 ranted.
 Respecting the effect that limiting security has on poor persons, regula-
 tion of the sort described above creates incentives for creditors to lend to
 better risks, raise interest rates, or shift to other forms of security such as
 second mortgages on homes.70 This change in the mix of credit offerings
 constricts the ability of poor people to borrow more than it constricts the
 middle class. Poor people are relatively bad credit risks, are less able to
 pay high interest rates, and seldom can offer second mortgages. To show
 70 The FTC staff said of its proposed rule banning security interests in household goods
 that it was "not [meant] to prevent consumers from borrowing on the equity in their homes,
 stocks and bonds." Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 244.
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 that regulation of this sort has a differential effect on the poor's auton-
 omy, however, it is not enough to show that the law imposes greater
 constraints on them. If freedom of contract poses a greater threat to the
 poor's autonomy than to the autonomy of others, correspondingly greater
 restrictions on the poor's ability to contract are necessary.
 Two ways to show that security poses a peculiar threat to the poor
 exist, but neither seems persuasive. The first is to argue that the poor are
 less able than others to make intelligent choices between risking garnish-
 ment or foreclosure; as a result, they will risk foreclosure too frequently.
 The few studies of the poor's ability to conduct commercial transactions
 fail to support the conclusion that they are less competent than others to
 make decisions of this sort.71 The second way to show that security poses
 a greater threat to the poor's autonomy is to establish that erroneous
 economic choices have graver consequences for them. In this context,
 such an argument seems straightforward: the poor own fewer goods
 through which to realize themselves than do the middle class; hence,
 foreclosure poses a greater threat to their autonomy. For this argument to
 succeed, however, a theory must exist relating the nature of a loss to its
 effect on autonomy. No such theory is now available.
 To perceive the effect of this absence, suppose that a middle-class
 person gives a second mortgage on his home to finance recreational ex-
 penditures. The debtor knows that he will have difficulty in paying the
 debt when it is due but expects to refinance it on the strength of apprecia-
 tion in his home's value. Instead, interest rates rise and housing prices
 fall, in consequence of which the debtor defaults and loses his home.72
 The debtor has lost not only money but also social status, for he is no
 longer a homeowner; he cannot realize his life's plan in the manner he had
 expected. Also, he has lost a place with which his "personhood" may
 have been bound up. Do losses of this sort pose less grave threats to
 personal autonomy than a poor person's loss of particular household
 effects, such as a television? It is difficult to derive an answer to this
 question from either of the property theories discussed above. But if the
 relation between type of loss and autonomy is obscure, the claim that
 greater restrictions on the poor's ability to contract are necessary because
 unregulated contract poses a greater threat to the poor's autonomy cannot
 be sustained. Rather, what is left is the apparent fact that regulation
 limiting security constrains the choices of poor people more than it con-
 strains the choices of middle-class people, even though no showing has
 "7 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1079-81.
 72 For stories like this, see "Creative Financing" Comes Homes to Roost in Bankruptcy
 Court, Los Angeles Times, December 28, 1981, ?4, at 1-2.
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 been made that the poor's autonomy is put more at risk by the mortgage
 decision. To justify a rule that makes things relatively worse for poor
 people, the autonomy-enhancing effects of this rule for all should be plain.
 The illustration above, however, seemingly fails to support this; what is to
 be gained from restricting security, in terms of increases in the ability of
 persons to lead fuller and freer lives, is quite hazy.
 The third argument in support of treating mortgages like sales is that the
 threat to autonomy that foreclosure may pose should be dealt with in
 bankruptcy contexts if at all. This again is largely because of the obscurity
 of the relevant property theories. The theory that justifies allowing people
 to retain an irreducible minimum of goods in order to lead full and autono-
 mous lives is of little help in specifying the minimum in a concrete sense,
 partly because the minimum varies as among persons. Also, the theory
 that protects "personal property" is so far unable to identify what prop-
 erty falls into this class apart from a few paradigm cases, again because
 what is personal varies with people's preferences. Restrictions on the
 taking of security thus will be both over- and underinclusive; they will
 leave particular people with too few or too many goods or goods of the
 wrong kind. The degree of misspecification cannot now be assessed given
 the relatively primitive nature of the theories. To be sure, doing some
 of the right thing often is preferable to doing nothing, but the issue is when
 the something should be done. The choice is to pursue autonomy con-
 cerns in the context of bankruptcies, largely by exempting assets, or to
 pursue them prophylactically, by prohibiting contracts. It was said above
 that giving a general answer to this question requires a fuller treatment
 than can be attempted here. But when so little is known about the ef-
 fects-in the relevant moral sense-of restricting a particular form of
 contracting, it seems more appropriate because less intrusive to pursue
 the relevant moral concerns in the bankruptcy context, when financial
 disaster has actually occurred. At least then the law confronts people who
 plainly rieed help.
 To summarize, moral objections to security apparently follow from a
 concern for personal autonomy; people should be allowed to retain a
 minimum of goods, or goods that have peculiar significance to them, in
 order to lead full and autonomous lives. The question these objections
 pose, however, is not whether people should have rights to things against
 involuntary seizure but whether whatever rights they do have are alien-
 able. Persons should be allowed to give purchase money security interests
 because this form of security helps them to acquire the things in which
 their autonomy partly inheres. The case against security of other sorts
 must lie in the supposed inability of people to perceive fully the threat to
 their autonomy that mortgages pose; for society's moral intuitions seem
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 untroubled by the right people now have to sell property that they cannot
 fully lien. The ability of persons to mortgage, however, should be treated
 as the ability to sell now is. This is because moral theories that relate
 autonomy to the possession of things seem insufficiently developed to
 justify the actual interference with autonomy that restricting the ability to
 mortgage seemingly creates.
 VI. CONCLUSION
 The ability of parties to consumer credit transactions to contract for
 security interests in consumer goods has been significantly limited in
 recent years, and further limitations are commonly proposed. Three
 justifications for this regulation have been influential with decision mak-
 ers: creditors systematically fail to maximize the proceeds from the sale
 of repossessed collateral, thereby increasing the size of the deficiency
 judgments that debtors must pay; repossession of consumer goods "de-
 stroys value," in the sense that debtors lose the difference between the
 valuation they attach to the collateral and its used goods market price,
 with no corresponding gain being conferred on anyone; and repossession
 is not done to acquire the proceeds the collateral could bring but for in
 terrorem purposes, to coerce repayment. The current opposition to per-
 sonal property security also seems animated by moral concerns, in partic-
 ular the belief that an untrammeled right to repossess will unduly erode
 the personal autonomy of debtors by depriving them of property neces-
 sary for the leading of full and autonomous lives.
 This paper has shown that these justifications cannot support limiting
 the parties' ability to contract for security. Creditors have strong incen-
 tives to maximize the value of repossessed goods, and the sparse avail-
 able evidence indicates that they do so. Repossessions either do not de-
 stroy value at all or merely transfer it, thereby vitiating objections to it
 resting on the premise that it is wasteful. In terrorem repossessions occur
 less frequently than is commonly supposed; and they are not morally
 offensive when their purpose and effect are understood. And the property
 rights case against security, that its use threatens personal autonomy,
 cannot sustain limitations on the ability of informed and competent con-
 sumers to mortgage their property.
 The argument made here, however, does not assert that personal prop-
 erty security should be unregulated. When particular consumers are unin-
 formed or incompetent, for example, traditional contract law reasons
 drawn from unconscionability theory support refusing to enforce unpleas-
 ant aspects of the contracts they make. Of greater importance, "markets
 for contract terms" sometimes may not reach competitive equilibria be-
 cause of the expense to consumers of acquiring information about their
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 contracts; a good case for regulation often exists when information prob-
 lems cause markets to behave badly.73 Regulation following from tradi-
 tional unconscionability theory or that is likely to cure information prob-
 lems will differ in form and effect from the restrictions on security
 discussed here.74 It is regulation of this latter type that is without coherent
 justification and that should not be used. Attention instead should turn to
 the question whether contracts to grant security interests in consumer
 goods raise problems similar to those thought to be raised by contracts
 containing broad warranty disclaimers and the like.
 APPENDIX
 The proof below generalizes the textual examples in Sec. IIA above to show
 that it always pays a creditor to maximize the proceeds of resale. For conve-
 nience, the proof assumes that the creditor's discount rate, r, is zero; this assump-
 tion is relaxed at appropriate points.
 D = total unpaid debt;
 M = value of a maximizing resale;
 N = value of a nonmaximizing resale;
 b = discount rate for bankruptcy recovery ($0.12 on the dollar in the text);
 p = probability of debtor insolvency;
 c = marginal cost per dollar of debt collected by resale;
 c' = marginal cost per dollar of debt collected by deficiency action;
 Rm = creditor's recovery when he maximizes resale value;
 R, = creditor's recovery when he does not maximize resale value;
 D - M = debt remaining after a maximizing resale = A;
 D - N = debt remaining after a nonmaximizing resale = B.
 73 See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
 Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Penn. L. Rev. 630 (1979).
 74 These differences should not be overstated. For example, the most appropriate re-
 sponse to information problems is to require disclosure, but if the costs of disclosure are
 excessive, an outright ban of a particular practice is occasionally the best solution. These
 cases, however, are unlikely to correspond closely to the cases for regulation that have been
 developed from the four justifications rejected here, because information problems raise
 quite different issues. The statutes criticized here may also be thought of as provisions of a
 state-supplied insurance contract; debtors pay higher interest rates but are "insured"
 against an unpleasant consequence that would otherwise attend default, the consequence
 that is repossession. The question then is whether the insurance contract is optimal. This
 largely is a function of whether consumers are informed, an issue beyond the scope of this
 paper. In addition, if these statutes are regarded as an insurance policy, other questions
 arise. For example, do the statutes generate an unacceptable level of moral hazard, in the
 sense that they help cause an excessive number of defaults? If these statutes were repealed,
 and if creditors had difficulty distinguishing debtors likely to default from those who are not,
 would low risk debtors have an incentive to grant excessively broad security interests to
 creditors as a way of demonstrating their creditworthiness? See Schwartz, supra note 8, at
 14-21; Samuel A. Rea, Arm-breaking Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, Working
 Paper No. WSIV-10, L. & Econ. Workshop Ser., Univ. Toronto (1982). These questions
 also fall within the set of contract law reasons which, though excluded from discussion here,
 are of considerable importance.
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 If Rm > Rn, it pays to maximize.
 Rm = (M - cM) + (1 - p)[(A + cM) - c'(A + cM)]
 + p(b)[(A + cM) - c'(A + cM)].
 R, = (N - cN) + (1 - p)[(B + cN) - c'(B + cN)]
 + p(b)[(B + cN) - c'(B + cN)J.
 M - N = B - A because the difference between a maximizing and a nonmax-
 imizing resale, M - N, equals the difference between the value of the debt
 remaining after a nonmaximizing resale and that remaining after a maximizing
 resale, B - A. Let (M - N) - c(M - N) = (B - A) - c(M - N) = X. Consider
 the expression X > (1 - p)(X - c'X) + p(b)(X - c'X). The right-hand side of this
 inequality is always less than the left-hand side. Substituting for X yields
 (M - N) - c(M - N)> (1 -p)[(B - A) - c(M - N) - c'(B - A) - c(M - N)]
 + p(b)[(B - A) -- c(M - N) - c'(B - A) - c(M - N)].
 Rearranging terms yields
 (M - N) + (1 - p)[(A + cM) - c'(A + cM)]
 + p(b)[(A + cM) - c'(A + cM)] > (N - cN)
 + (1 - p)[(B + cN) - c'(B + cN)] + p(b)[(B + cN) - c'(B + cN)].
 The expression to the left of the inequality sign is Rm; the expression to the right is
 Rn. Thus it always is the case that Rm > Rn; creditors do better by maximizing
 resale proceeds. This result obtains independently of the costs of recovering a
 debt by resale as contrasted with the costs of recovery in a deficiency action.
 To better understand what has been proved, focus once more on the expression
 X > (1 - p)(X - c' X) + p(b)(X - c' X). The left-hand side is the net difference
 between a value-maximizing and a nonmaximizing resale. This sum is greater than
 the right-hand side-the inequality is satisfied-when p = 0 or b = 1. What
 primarily drives the proof is the creditor's assumed inability to recover the costs
 of suit; if these costs vary directly with the amounts involved, which seems likely,
 the creditor has an incentive to sue for as little as possible. As a consequence, he
 has an incentive to sell the collateral for as much as possible-to maximize resale
 value. Creditors often use contract clauses that attempt to impose litigation costs
 on debtors. Supposing such a clause to exist, if p = 0 (the debtor with certainty
 can respond to a damage judgment), the inequality cannot be satisfied, for the
 right-hand term reduces to X; the creditor is indifferent to whether he maximizes
 or not. But it is plausible to assume that the creditor's discount rate is positive; the
 right-hand side then must be divided by a number greater than one, and so be-
 comes less than X. Thus even when the debtor bears the costs of suit and can
 respond with certainty to any judgment against him, maximizing resale proceeds
 remains the profitable strategy. Finally, if p > 1 but b = 1-the creditor can
 collect 100 percent on the dollar including litigation costs in a bankruptcy proceed-
 ing-the inequality also cannot be satisfied; the right-hand side once more reduces
 to X. Again, however, if r > 0, it still pays to maximize. The significant point,
 though, is that 0 < p < 1 and 0 < b < 1 always; hence, maximizing resale proceeds
 is the profitable strategy regardless of whether litigation costs vary with the
 amounts involved, or of which party bears these costs, or of the creditor's dis-
 count rate.
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